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ABSTRACT 
Historically, mining has been viewed as an inherently high-risk industry. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of new technology and a heightened concern for safety has 
yielded marked reductions in accident and injury rates over the last several decades. In an 
effort to further reduce these rates, the human factors associated with incidents/accidents 
need to be addressed. A modified version of the Human Factors Classification and 
Analysis System (HFCAS-MI) was used to analyze lost time accidents and high-potential 
incidents from across Queensland, Australia and fatal accidents from the United States of 
America (USA) to identify human factor trends and system deficiencies within mining. 
An analysis of the data revealed that skill-based errors (referred to as routine disruption 
errors by industry) were the most common unsafe act and showed no significant 
differences between accident types. Findings for unsafe acts were consistent across the 
time period examined. The percentages of cases associated with preconditions were also 
not significantly different between accident types.  
Higher tiers of HFACS-MI were associated with a significantly higher percentage 
of fatal accidents than non-fatal accidents. These results suggest that there are differences 
in the underlying causal factors between fatal and non-fatal accidents. By illuminating 
human causal factors in a systematic fashion, this study has provided mine safety 
professionals the information necessary to reduce mine accidents/incidents further. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Mining has historically been viewed as a high-risk industry in which injuries are 
simply a part of the job. However, improvements in the mining industry have resulted in 
a decrease in injuries and fatalities. According to the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration, since 2000, the fatality rate per 200,000 hours worked has decreased 
44%. Although the rate of fatalities has seen a dramatic drop over the last decade years, 
there are still a high number of mine workers killed or injured annually.  
Technological advancements have successfully decreased the number of injuries 
and fatalities, but these numbers continue to remain unacceptably high. In an effort to 
further reduce fatality and injury rates, the role of human error in accidents and incidents 
was studied. Two distinct data sets have been used in this analysis. The first study looks 
at the role of human error in 508 high-potential incidents and lost time accidents in 
Queensland, Australia. The second study looks at 254 fatal accidents in the United States 
of America. A modified version of the human factors analysis and classification system 
(HFACS-MI) was used to classify errors and system deficiencies.   
Results from the first study revealed causal factors at all tiers of HFACS-MI 
except for the fifth tier of outside factors. An unsafe act was identified in 94% of the 
cases analyzed. At this level, skill-based errors were most often identified. At the 
preconditions for unsafe acts tier, the technical and physical environments were the most 
often identified causal categories. With the adverse and rapidly changing conditions on 
mine sites, the physical environment was expected to be a highly identified contributing 
factor. 
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At the higher tiers of HFACS-MI, causal factors were associated with fewer 
cases. When codes were identified, they tended to center around a single category. 
Inadequate leadership is the most often cited causal factor at the leadership level. 
Organizational process was the most often cited causal factor at the organizational 
influences level; that category deals with the development and implementation of 
standard operating procedures (SOPs).  
Results from the second study were similar to results from the first at the lower 
two tiers of HFACS-MI. An unsafe act was identified in about 80% of fatal accident 
cases. Like non-fatal incidents/accidents, skill-based errors were the most often identified 
error form. For fatal accidents, preconditions for an unsafe act were actually associated 
with a higher percentage of cases (81.9%). Within this category, the physical and 
technical environments were once again the most often identified causal categories.  
For fatal accidents, the upper levels of HFACS-MI were associated with 
significantly more cases than non-fatal accidents. This implies that problems at the 
organizational and leadership levels are more likely to result in fatal accidents. In order to 
reduce the potential for fatal accidents, interventions need to be aimed at improving 
leadership and organizational deficiencies.  
While the lower two layers of HFACS-MI had no significant differences between 
fatal and non-fatal accidents, there were differences at the specific exemplars identified. 
This suggests that while the error forms are similar, accident severity may vary on the 
specific error type that occurs.  
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Overall, the use of HFACS-MI proved to be a systematic process for identifying 
causal factors for fatal and non-fatal accidents. Results suggested the following: 1) 
differences exist between fatal and non-fatal accidents causal factors, 2) differences exist 
in the unsafe acts committed between mine sites, and 3) interventions introduced before 
or during the time span of this analysis aimed at reducing human error did not work. The 
use of HFACS-MI has established a baseline for measuring the success of future human 
factors interventions.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The mining industry has historically been viewed as a high-risk environment. 
While the industry has seen recent success in safety, it still remains one of the most high-
risk professions worldwide (Mitchell et al., 1998). In Australia and the USA,  the mining 
industry continues to have accident rates higher than that of any other industry (Bennet 
and Passmore, 1984; Hull et al., 1996). From July 2006 to June 2007, there were 367 
reported mining accidents in Queensland, Australia with a frequency rate of five 
accidents for every million hours worked (DME, 2007). In 2005, the USA mining 
industry had an average lost time injury rate of 2.9 per 100 full time employees. Though 
these statistics point towards an improving industry, these rates suggest a system in which 
a continued focus on safety will result in still lower accident and injury rates.   
Adverse working conditions lead miners to be exposed to hazards including 
flooding, explosive agents, the risk of asphyxia, etc (Mitchell et al., 1998). Although 
these hazards are present, the majority of accidents cannot solely be attributed to adverse 
working conditions. A study by the US Bureau of Mines found that almost 85% of all 
accidents can be attributed to at least one human error (Rushworth et al., 1999). In 
Australia, two out of every three occupational accidents can be attributed to human error 
(Williamson and Feyer, 1990). With the high percentage of incidents and accidents 
attributed to human error, it is vital that accident investigations begin to identify 
contributing factors attributed to human error and organizational or system deficiencies.   
Although the majority of incidents and accidents that occur on mine sites do not 
result in either single or multiple fatalities, the cost to the organization for each incident is 
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significant. Even without a resulting injury, the organization encounters repair costs, 
downtime and the allotment of personnel for investigation. Unscheduled downtime has a 
negative impact on production and efficiency. True value can be added to the company 
by eliminating these additional costs by reducing incident and accident rates.  
In 2007 at the annual Queensland Mining Industry Safety and Health Conference 
in Townsville, Australia, a request was put forth by the industry members present to the 
Department of Mines and Energy (DME) to start investigating the role of human error in 
mining accidents and incidents. To fulfill this request, DME initiated a project in which a 
human factors graduate student would begin a study to identify the leading causes of 
human error within the state of Queensland.  
In order to identify trends in human error and organizational deficiencies, a 
modified version of the human factors analysis and classification system framework for 
use specifically within the mining industry (HFACS-MI) was developed to analyze 
incidents/accidents. The analysis covers 508 high-potential and lost time incidents that 
occurred in Queensland, Australia from 2004 to 2008 and 254 fatal accidents that 
occurred in the USA from 2004 to 2008. Data from Australia was supplied by the 
Queensland Government’s Department of Mines and Energy. Data from the USA was 
gathered from fatal accident reports published on the Mines Safety and Health 
Administration’s website. Together, these analyses will provide valuable information, 
such as error trends specific to a mining type/time of day/year and trends in system 
deficiencies helping the mining industry to mitigate risk by identifying the most 
significant areas of human error.   
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The first step in reducing human error related incidents and accidents is to 
identify the error forms and organizational problems that are culminating in adverse 
events. The primary goal in this research is to identify the causal and contributing factors 
for mining incidents and accidents. This research also aims to identify whether 
demographic differences will cause significant differences in causal factors. Finally, this 
research aims to identify the underlying differences between fatal and non-fatal accidents.   
The second chapter of this dissertation describes the previous research into 
mining accidents, human error, and human error taxonomies and frameworks including 
the one used for the basis of the analytical framework used for this research. The methods 
chapter presents the modification to the original HFACS framework, data collection, 
coding, and the basic statistical analysis used. The results of this research are given in the 
fourth chapter along with a detailed description and discussion of the significance. The 
fifth chapter presents a comparison of the two studies and discusses potential reasons for 
these differences. The final chapter presents concluding remarks, the significance of the 
research and findings, and possible continuing research.    
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Mining Regulations 
In an effort to control the safety of workers, government organizations have been 
developed to regulate the safety and health of the mining industry. The safety and health 
of miners in the USA is regulated by the Mine Safety and Health Administration 
(MSHA) sector of the US Department of Labor. MSHA was created in 1978 as a result of 
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. MSHA is charged with developing and 
enforcing safety and health rules, helping mines comply with these rules and offers 
technical, educational and other types of assistance. The predecessor of MHSA was the 
Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA) which was created by the 
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1968, referred to as the Coal Act.  
In Australia, mines are governed and regulated at the state level. In particular, the 
DME, a part of the Queensland government, regulates all mines, explosives, and 
petroleum and gas industries across Queensland. Within DME, there is a Mining Safety 
and Health division that oversees safety and health regulations, conducts audits and 
inspection across all industry sectors, issues licenses and authorizations, and provides 
advice and facilitates improved standards and practice. Both agencies also undertake 
investigations and provide emergency services when needed.   
There are, in general, four main types of regulatory standards that are used to 
influence worker behavior. These four types are prescriptive, general duty of care, 
performance-based and systematic process-based (Gunningham, 2005). A prescriptive 
approach gives explicit information regarding how a hazard must be controlled and 
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leaves little to no room for independent interpretation of the standard. With a general 
duty of care approach, principles or goals are set out that must be met, but a way to 
achieve those principles is not identified. Performance standards specify what the 
outcome of safety measures must be, but leave the measures to ensure this outcome up to 
the individual mine. Finally, process based standards identify a series of steps that must 
be followed (Gunningham, 2005).  
In the early years of mining legislation, Queensland’s government relied most 
heavily on prescriptive standards (Hopkins and Wilkinson, 2005). This left little room for 
mines to develop their own safety measures and did not account for the vastly different 
needs of many mines. In an effort to overhaul outdated mining legislation and move from 
prescriptive standards to general duty of care standards, the Queensland’s government—
with the help of DME—developed new standards in the late 1990s. These standards 
included the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act of 1999 (CMSHA) and Mining and 
Quarrying Safety and Health Act of 1999 (MQSHA).    
The USA mining industry also went through restructuring during the latter half of 
the 1900s. The first step at improving mining safety and health was through the Coal Act 
of 1969. This act was later amended by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments 
Act, or Mine Act of 1977. These amendments renamed “MESA” to “MSHA” and 
expanded their enforcement power to include all mines (Nieto and Duerksen, 2008). The 
most recent mining legislation for the USA was the Mine Improvement and New 
Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER). This act expanded the power of MHSA and 
created stricter legislation. The largest component of the MINER Act dealt with mine 
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rescue operations. Besides the acts stated above, mines in the USA are regulated by 30 
codes of federal regulation (CFR).  
In both Queensland and the USA, incidents and accidents must be reported to the 
respective regulator. In the USA, mine operators are required to contact MSHA within 15 
minutes of an accident occurring (30 CFR 50.10). In Queensland, mine operators have to 
report accidents and high-potential incidents within 24 hours. The USA requires a follow-
up form to be completed within 10 days of the accident for all reported accidents. DME 
inspectors are in charge of deciding whether an incident or accident needs to have a 
follow-up form completed.  
2.2 Mining Techniques  
Many mining methods exist for extracting minerals or other materials from 
underground ore bodies, veins, or seams. On the surface, open-pit mining, quarrying, 
strip mining, and placer mining are common. For subsurface mining, sites are 
distinguished by the extraction technique and access shafts. Extraction techniques include 
room and pillar, long wall, bore hole, drift and fill, and retreat mining. Underground 
mines are generally accessed through a horizontal access tunnel or vertical shafts 
(Hustrulid, 1982). The mining technique used depends largely on the geology of the area.  
2.3 Mining Accidents 
As a high-risk industry, the history of mining has been filled with large scale 
mining accidents. On March 6, 1906, the largest mining disaster in European history 
occurred when 1,099 miners were killed in a dust explosion at the Courrrières mine in 
northern France("French Mine Disaster", 1906). In 1921, 75 men were killed in northern 
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Queensland after an explosion at the Mount Mulligan mine (Barwick, 1999). Germany 
experienced a disaster when 299 men were killed at the Luisenthal mine in 1962 ("Six are 
found", 1988). More recent disasters include the Moura Mine explosion in 1994 that 
killed 11 men in Queensland (Hopkins, 2001), Nanshan Colliery explosion in northern 
China killing 24 men in 2006 ("25 dead in coal mine", 2006), and the 2006 Sago mine 
explosion in West Virginia killing 12 miners (Dao, 2006). Accidents of this magnitude 
attract enormous attention from the media but occur rarely, while on a daily basis, miners 
are continuously in situations that could lead to injuries or even death.  
The definition of a mining accident differs slightly under USA and Australian 
legislation. In Australia, a mining accident is an “event, or series of events, at a mine 
causing injury to a person.” A serious accident is an “accident at a mine that causes the 
death of a person, or a person to be admitted to a hospital as an in-patient for treatment of 
injury.”1  Under USA legislation, a mining accident includes “a death of an individual at 
a mine; an injury to an individual at a mine which has a reasonable potential to cause 
death; an entrapment of an individual for more than 30 minutes or which has a reasonable 
potential to cause death” (30 CFR 50.2)2
                                                 
1 These definitions are supplied from the Queensland Government’s CMSHA and MQSHA.  
. Though similar, USA regulations identify a 
broader definition for accidents. However, the USA does not define a high-potential 
incident. A high-potential incident is an “event, or series of events, that causes or has the 
potential to cause a significant adverse effect on the safety and health of a person.” A lost 
time injury is any incident or accident that results in an injury where the person misses 
work for more than the day the injury occurred.  
2 Refer to the regulation for the complete list of accident definitions.  
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2.4 Injury Rate 
According to statistics from MSHA, there have been recent improvements in the 
safety and health of miners. Since the early 1990s, the number of injuries per 100,000 
miners working has steadily declined. This is true for both coal mining and metal/non-
metal mining. Today, there are around 4,700 injuries per 100,000 workers in coal mines 
and 2,800 injuries per 100,000 workers in metal/non-metal mines yearly. This represents 
a 56% decrease in coal mining injuries since its peak in 1988 and a 66% decrease in 
metal/non-metal mining injuries since its peak in 1978.   
 Ural and Demirkol (2008) compared the occupational safety and health of surface 
mines across the world. They found that the non-fatal accident rate per 100,000 workers 
in Australia, Germany, Great Britain, New Zealand, and the USA is significantly lower 
than that of Turkey and South Africa. The analysis did not, however, determine if there 
were significant differences between the accident rates of Australia, Germany, Great 
Britain, New Zealand and the USA.  
Similar trends exist with mining fatalities as well. There has been a decline in the 
number of fatalities per 100,000 workers since 1931. Since the peak in the early 1940s, 
the coal and metal/non-metal mining industries have seen a greater than 90% reduction in 
fatalities per 100,000 miners. The rate of fatalities for miners working in the coal industry 
is greater than that for other mining industries. One possible reason for this higher rate is 
the unstable nature of coal mines and the greater probability of gas ignitions and 
explosions. Underground coal mining represents the most dangerous mining environment 
(Karra, 2005).  
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When fatal accidents are looked at world-wide, the EU15 (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), Australia, Germany, Great Britain, New 
Zealand and the USA have fatal accident rates that are significantly lower than the rates 
of Turkey and South Africa (Ural and Demirkol, 2008). Interestingly, the incidence rate 
per 100,000 workers for the EU15 is considerably higher than the rate for Great Britain 
and Germany. Because accident data for Germany and Great Britain are also included in 
the statistics for the EU15, this means that there are countries in the EU15 that have 
accident rates considerably higher than average.  
Because of the adverse conditions in which miners work, they are exposed to a 
variety of potentially hazardous situations. High demands on operators, constantly 
changing road designs, the physical strength required to handle the mass of the trucks, 
long tedious drives, rough roads and loading impacts all contribute to the overall health 
and safety problems in the mining industry (Randolph and Boldt, 1996). Improvements in 
equipment and road designs over the years have helped to reduce injuries, but even with 
these improvements, the frequency rates for fatalities and injuries still remain at 
unacceptable levels. Coal mining operations continue to be the most dangerous for 
workers as injury frequency and severity rates are higher than the average for all 
industries (Bennet and Passmore, 1984). The probability of sustaining an injury resulting 
in 10 or more lost workdays was 0.52 for coal mine workers compared to 0.35 for 
metal/non-metal mine workers (Coleman and Kerkering, 2007). While mining method 
was not related to the degree of injury, those miners that worked at a shaft or slope were 
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associated with lower injury severity than those miners working at the face (Bennet and 
Passmore, 1985b).  
Much research has been conducted on the effect of job experience on injury 
severity. In general, injury severity is unrelated to total mining experience, job 
experience, and experience in the mine where the injury occurred (ex. Bennet and 
Passmore, 1985a, b; Lee et al., 1993; Maiti and Bhattacherjee, 1999; Maiti et al., 1999). 
When comparing worker age and experience level, it was found that injuries in coal 
mines are affected more by experience at the company than by age (Butani, 1988).  
In a review of literature by Salminen (2004), 56% of studies showed that younger 
workers had a higher injury rate than older workers, 17% showed the opposite results, 
and 27% showed no difference between older and younger workers. When trying to link 
age and experience with accident rate, there are numerous other factors that must be 
taken into account, including job characteristics and the fact that physical and mental 
capabilities reduce with age.  
Breslin and Smith (2005) found that some studies show similar or lower accident 
rates for younger workers simply because of the denominator used during comparison. 
The studies they looked at used number of injuries per number of workers in the age 
group instead of using injuries per hour worked. With younger workers, part-time and 
seasonal employment is more likely, so the risk of injury for younger workers was 
underestimated.  
Interaction with electricity is a problem on mine sites. Cawley (2003) reports that 
from 1990-1999, electricity was the fourth leading cause of death and the fourteenth 
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leading cause of injuries on mine sites. Cawley also found that electrical shock accounted 
for 70 out of 75 fatal accidents, and burns were the leading cause of injuries. Over one 
fourth of electrical fatalities are attributed to accidental contact with live overhead wires 
(Homce et al., 2001). High-reaching mobile equipment often comes in contact with 
overhead power supplies and the metal frames become energized, sometimes without the 
operator noticing. From 1980-1997, in 57% of cases involving overhead power lines, 
operators were unaware of the contact until one or more workers touched the energized 
frames and were injured.  
From 1995-2004 in the USA, 49% of incidents involved the use of mining 
equipment while 77% of fatalities resulted from the use of equipment (Groves et al., 
2007). Haulage trucks were the most often cited machinery involved in these fatal 
accidents. Other mobile equipment frequently involved in mining injuries and death are 
front-end loaders, conveyors, dozers, and continuous miners. Continuous miners are 
associated with the highest injury severity (Groves et al., 2007) for all mobile equipment. 
The use of non-powered hand tools were a factor in 24% of incidents. These incidents 
often arise because industrial tools are larger and heavier than the household versions 
workers are used to and because of less than ideal working conditions on mine sites.  
Kecojevic, Komljenovic et al. (2007) found that the most common types of 
accidents involving mobile equipment are collisions with pedestrians. Each year, an 
average of five pedestrians are killed at surface and underground metal/non-metal mines 
as a result of collisions with mobile equipment (Ruff and Hession-Kunz, 2001). Fatalities 
involving mobile equipment frequently are caused by a lack of visibility from the cab of 
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the truck (Ruff, 2001). Blind spots on the cab are caused by cab posts, vehicle lights and 
light brackets (Eger et al., 2004). Line of sight impairments are caused by objects such as 
buckets, booms, radio remote boxes, and fire extinguishers. Kecojevic Komljenovic et al. 
(2007) also found that the most common root causes of equipment related fatalities are 
failure of mechanical components, lack of and/or failure to obey warning signals and 
inadequate or substandard mechanical procedures. Contributing factors include 
inadequate training, poor haulage road and dump area designs and the failure to wear 
seatbelts.  
At mines with higher accident rates, workers were more likely to report they were 
overworked and were troubled by the behavior of their co-workers (Gordon, 1988). These 
mines were also characterized by poor scheduling and planning and more 
misunderstandings over directions and assignments. Low accident rate mines have clearer 
instructions when compared to high accident mines and are characterized by the 
abundance of training and keeping good safety records.  
2.5 Human Error 
Human error is the “failure of planned actions to achieve the desired events 
without the intervention of unforeseeable events” (Reason, 1990). Only when judged on 
the basis of the outcome does the performer know that an error was committed 
(Rasmussen, 1982). Forms of human error are neither as varied nor abundant as would 
seem. Errors take on a similar pattern across different forms of mental activities (Reason, 
1990). This pattern allows for the investigation of error at a global level.   
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Rasmussen (1982) categorized human error according to the level of cognition 
involved. Behavior is divided into three categories: skill-based, rule-based, and 
knowledge-based. Skill-based behaviors take place at an unconscious level and are often 
automated in nature. Rule-based behaviors deal with the application of learned rules such 
as policies and procedures through decision making. Errors occur when an individual 
uses the wrong rule or misapplies a good rule. The final category of human behavior is 
knowledge-based. This refers to novel instances where an individual must apply previous 
knowledge. These tasks require high mental demand which can cause problems in 
unusual emergency situations. Errors occur from a lack of training or information. The 
foundation that Rasmussen (1982) laid with his skills, rules, and knowledge behavior 
system lead to further classification of both errors and violations.  
Reason (1990; 1995) uses the term “unsafe acts” to describe errors and violations 
committed by an individual or individuals that lead to an adverse event. Errors can be 
classified into two forms. First, the planned course of action is adequate, but the plan is 
not carried out as intended. These errors are commonly referred to as slips or lapses, and 
are errors of execution. Slips and lapses occurring during highly automated tasks and 
situations. Slips and lapses are associated with recognition, attention, memory, or 
selection failures. Second is when a plan is executed as intended, but the plan is 
inadequate for the situation. These error types are mistakes and generally arise from 
failures of intention.  
Mistakes are furthered categorized as rule-based or knowledge-based. Rule-based 
mistakes occur when a situation is similar in nature to previous events and the individual 
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uses information from those events to solve the situation at hand. The individual relies on 
previous knowledge and training. The mistake arises when the individual misapplies a 
good rule, fails to apply a good rule, or applies a bad rule. Knowledge-based mistakes 
occur during new situations in which an individual must form a solution without adequate 
knowledge of the problem. Without previous knowledge or information, the mind must 
develop a solution with inaccurate or inadequate knowledge of the problem. Knowledge-
based mistakes are often subject to personal biases (Reason, 1995).  
Violations are the willful disregard of established rules and regulations and can 
either be routine or exceptional. Violations can increase the probability of error and the 
likelihood that the error results in a negative outcome (Reason et al., 1998). Routine 
violations are the habitual “bending” of rules that are condoned by management. 
Exceptional violations are isolated departures from the rules and regulations that are 
neither condoned by management nor indicative to the individual’s behavior. These 
violations are highly uncommon and difficult to predict.   
Errors can be viewed as a breakdown within an individual’s mental activity. 
These breakdowns can occur in attention, memory, retention, decision making, etc. When 
classifying error, it is also vital to discuss the intention of the individual. Intentional and 
unintentional behavior is an important distinction in classifying human error (Reason, 
1990).      
Sater and Alexander (2000) categorized human error as either errors of omission, 
commission, or substitution. Errors of omission occur when an individual fails to perform 
a required task. Errors of commission occur when the individual carries out an action in 
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either the incorrect manner or at the incorrect time. Substitution errors arise when an 
individual carries out the incorrect actions.  
Human error has been described and categorized in numerous ways. 
Unfortunately, along with many ways to categorize human error comes a lack of common 
definitions and criteria of coding errors (O'Hare, 2000). This lack of consistency leads to 
an inability to share and compare data across industries and countries. According to 
O’Hare (2000), this “may be one of the reasons why the proportion of accidents 
considered due to human error has remained stubbornly high for several decades.”   
2.6 Human Error Taxonomies 
Human error models, taxonomies, and classification systems have been developed 
in attempts to understand the causes of human error. The perspectives of these models 
include: the cognitive perspective (Rasmussen, 1982; Wickens and Flach, 1988), the 
ergonomic perspective (Edwards, 1988), the behavioral perspective (Peterson, 1971), the 
epidemiological perspective (Suchman, 1961), and the psychosocial perspective 
(Helmreich and Foushee, 1993). Newer models tend to look at accidents as a result of a 
combination of causes that interact with each other. These models have moved from 
focusing on a single element of accident causation, to looking at the system as a whole. 
These models represent a systems or organizational approach to accident investigation.  
2.6.1 SHEL Model  
The SHEL model was originally developed by Edwards (1972; in Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2003) to encompass human factors into system design. The model describes 
human–machine interactions and identifies where areas of failure can occur. The SHEL 
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model divides failures into four categories: software, hardware, environment conditions, 
and liveware (Figure 1). Software refers to the documents, policies, regulations, and 
standards upon which the system operates. Hardware is composed of the physical 
resources, such as machines, that are used within the system. Environmental condition 
refers to the physical environment in which the system operates. The final aspect of the 
SHEL model is liveware, or the people who are involved with the system. Failures occur 
in the system when any one of the components or the connections between components 
fails. This model puts primary focus on the man–machine interface when looking from a 
systems approach.   
 
Figure 1: SHEL model adapted from Edwards (1972)  
 20 
 
2.6.2 Incident Cause Analysis Method (ICAM)  
The incident cause analysis method (ICAM) was developed by BHP Billiton and 
officially launched in April 2000 (Gibbs et al., 2001). The ICAM process (Figure 2) was 
developed with the help of James Reason, The Australian Transport Safety Bureau, and 
Dédale Asia Pacific. The ICAM philosophy most closely follows the work of James 
Reason. ICAM is based on three main beliefs: 1) the root causes of all accidents can be 
linked to organizational deficiencies, 2) human error is inevitable and must be accepted, 
and 3) if an organization is serious about accident reduction then new approaches must be 
used, and one must learn from past mistakes. ICAM is an investigation tool that aims to 
first identify the organizational deficiencies and failed defenses, then develop 
recommendations to address these deficiencies in the system defenses and organizational 
process. Together with the SCM and these beliefs, the ICAM process has been used to 
investigate accidents across many industries.  
The objectives of an ICAM investigation are: establishing the facts, identifying 
contributing factors and latent conditions, reviewing the adequacies of existing controls 
and procedures, reporting the findings, recommending corrective actions, detecting 
organizational factors that can identify recurring problems, and establishing key learned 
facts that can be distributed across the company (De Landre and Bartlem, 2005). Strongly 
structured into the ICAM system is the belief that the purpose of accident investigations 
is not to apportion blame or liability. With the use of the ICAM process during accident 
investigations, deficiencies within an organization can be identified and 
recommendations derived to correct those deficiencies. Recommendations for corrective 
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measures are based on the findings of failures in the organizational level and on the 
absent or failed defenses.  
 
Figure 2: The ICAM model of incident causation (De Landre and Bartlem 2005) 
2.6.3 Behavioral Safety (BeSafe) Method  
The Behavioral Safety (BeSafe) method is an example of an accident 
investigation technique that attempts to identify the latent causes of accidents. The 
BeSafe method, previously known as the “potential human error audits,” was developed 
by ergonomists at British Coal (Simpson, 1994). The framework for BeSafe (Figure 3) is 
modeled after Reason’s Swiss-Cheese model and tries to systematically address latent 
failures of the system (Benedyk and Minister, 1998). The goal of BeSafe is to identify 
areas where human error is possible before any errors occur. This is done through the use 
of ergonomics tools such as checklists, task analysis, and questionnaires. Accident 
statistics from an organization are only used as a check in this system as the approach is 
based on finding errors before they occur (Benedyk and Minister, 1998). 
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Figure 3: BeSafe Method (Benedyk and Minister 1998) 
2.6.4 Wheel of Misfortune  
In an attempt to analyze the role of human factors in accidents involving aviation 
or other complex systems, O’Hare (2000) developed a taxonomy called the “Wheel of 
Misfortune” (Figure 4). O’Hare’s taxonomy draws on the works of Helmreich (1990; in 
O'Hare, 2000) and Reason (1990). The basic structure of the Wheel of Misfortune is three 
concentric spheres representing the actions of the front line operators, local conditions, 
and organizational conditions. The innermost sphere, “local actions,” attempts to describe 
what happened. The second and third spheres aim to uncover why it happened.  
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Figure 4: The Wheel of Misfortune (O’Hare 2000) 
2.6.5 Swiss-Cheese Model (SCM)  
The SCM was developed by Professor James Reason (1990; 1997). In Reason’s 
model, accidents result from a breakdown within the system. Breakdowns within the 
system are a combination of active failures and latent conditions. Active failures are the 
unsafe acts of those directly in contact with the system and are most often associated with 
incidents/accidents. These failures can be classified as errors or violations and intended 
or unintended actions. Unintended errors are classified as slips and lapses. These types of 
errors are generally associated with automatic actions and include result from memory or 
attention lapses. Intended errors are classified as mistakes. Mistakes occur when an the 
individual fails to carry out the action as intended or carries the action out as intended, 
but the action was the incorrect response for the situation. Violations are intended actions 
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that are carried out with willful disregard to the established rules and regulations. Latent 
conditions of a system often go unnoticed until an adverse event occurs. These latent 
conditions take two forms, those that create error provoking conditions and those that 
create weaknesses in system defenses (Reason, 2000). Reason’s SCM of human error 
defines the relationship between active failures and latent conditions.  
 
Figure 5: Reason’s SCM for Human Error Causation (adapted from Reason 1990) 
 
Reason’s SCM is based on the assumption that there are fundamental components 
within an organization that must work together properly in order to achieve a safe and 
efficient system (Reason, 1990). In the model’s earliest version, Reason depicted a 
normal system as five “planes” lying behind each other. The five planes of the system 
are: top level decision makers, line management, preconditions, productive activities, and 
 25 
 
defenses. The “Swiss cheese” part of the model is when “holes” develop within different 
planes of the system. These holes are latent and active failures. The defenses of the 
system are dynamic and change with regards to system characteristics. Adverse events 
are a result of breakdowns in the interactions between components—or the lining up of 
latent and active failures to breach the defenses of the system.  
The second revision, Mark II, of the SCM reduced the number of planes to three, 
Organization, Task/Environment, and Individual, and extended the defenses’ plane into 
three layers. Also added to this version of the model was a latent failure path that led 
from the organization to the defenses to accommodate accidents in which no active 
failures were present (Reason et al., 2006).  
In 1997, Reason developed a third version of the SCM, Mark III. In this version, 
the labels associated with the planes were removed. The planes represent the barriers, 
controls, defenses, and safeguards of the system. An explanation of how the holes arise in 
the system was added. Arrows to distinguish the directions in which an accident occurs 
and in which an accident is investigated were added. In all of the versions, accidents and 
incidents are a result of latent and active failures within the organization, environment, 
and individuals that breach the defenses of the system to cause a loss.   
2.6.6 Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)  
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System was developed by Dr. 
Scott Shappell and Dr. Douglas Wiegmann for use with the US Navy. During 
development, effort was made to ensure that the framework was useful not only as a data 
analysis tool, but also a structure for accident investigation. The HFACS framework was 
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developed to define the latent and active failures that were identified in Reason’s SCM 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 2001; Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003). HFACS is a four-level 
framework that addresses unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, 
and organizational influences. “Unsafe acts” refers to the actions that occur immediately 
before an incident/accident and directly result in an adverse event. “Unsafe acts” is 
further divided into three error categories (skill-based, decision, and perceptual) and two 
violation categories (routine and exceptional). The “preconditions for unsafe acts” level 
describes the environmental and psychological conditions that lead to an unsafe act. 
These conditions include the physical and technological environments, communication, 
fitness for duty, physical and mental limitations, adverse mental states, and adverse 
physiological states.  
Unsafe supervision deals with the actions and decisions of the frontline 
management. Subcategories in this level include inadequate supervision, planned 
inappropriate operations, failure to correct known problems, and supervisory violation. 
Each of these tiers is divided into subcategories with a total of 19 causal categories in the 
original framework. Although developed for use within military aviation, HFACS has 
been shown to be effective in civil aviation (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001b, a; 
Wiegmann et al., 2005; Shappell et al., 2007), aviation maintenance (HFACS-ME: 
Krulak, 2004), air traffic control (HFACS-ATC: Broach and Dollar, 2002), railroads 
(HFACS-RR: Reinach and Viale, 2006), medicine (ElBardissi et al., 2007), and remotely 
piloted aircrafts (Tvaryanas et al., 2006).  
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Though used in industry, the HFACS framework is also an academic tool. As 
such, HFACS has undergone a rigorous process to ensure validity of the framework. The 
criterion used to validate the HFACS framework were reliability, comprehensiveness, 
diagnosticity, and usability (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003). Reliability refers to the 
framework’s ability to gather the same results regardless of who carries out the 
investigation and analysis. For use with USA military aviation, the HFACS framework 
had an excellent reliability with a Kappa value of 0.94 (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003). 
According to Fleiss (1981), a Kappa value of 0.60 to 0.74 is good and values over 0.75 
are considered excellent. The minimum value for any classification system should be 
0.60 or better. When used outside of military aviation in commercial aviation, the 
HFACS framework was found to have a Kappa value of 0.75 (Wiegmann and Shappell, 
2001b) showing that the HFACS framework was applicable outside of military aviation 
with slight modifications to terminology.  
Comprehensiveness refers to the framework’s ability to identify all key 
information surrounding an accident/incident. When using the HFACS framework to 
investigate aviation accidents, the developers found that they were able to capture all the 
current human error causal factors used in USA civil and military aviation databases, thus 
assessing the comprehensiveness of the system to be good.  
Diagnosticity refers to the framework’s ability to identify the relationships 
between errors along with trends and causes (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003). The 
diagnosticity of the HFACS framework has recently been statistically proven by Li and 
Harris (2008) with use in aviation.   
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Finally, usability refers to the framework’s ability to be transferred from 
theoretical and academic uses to practical use within industry. The usability of HFACS 
has been proven by the successful application of HFACS into accident investigation 
within industries and organizations, such as the Federal Aviation Administration.  
 
Figure 6: HFACS framework (adapted from Wiegmann and Shappell 2003)  
2.7 Criticism to Error Classification Systems 
Although widely used as an investigation and analysis tool, criticisms of HFACS 
have emerged. Dekker (2001) has suggested that HFACS is not identifying why an 
individual erred, but merely shifting blame for the error farther up the organizational 
chain. This argument stems from there being little evidence that causal factors in the 
higher levels of HFACS did contribute to operator error. However, recent studies (Li and 
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Harris, 2006; Tvaryanas et al., 2006) have found statistical relationships between various 
levels of the HFACS framework. This shows that HFACS is not merely shifting the 
blame, but uncovering latent conditions that have proven effects on operator 
performance.  
Early criticism of HFACS questioned the validity of the framework since the 
validity was established by the developers (Beaubien and Baker, 2002). Since this time, 
the HFACS framework has been validated by other authors (ex. Gaur, 2005; Li et al., 
2007). Reason’s SCM, upon which HFACS was developed, has recently been validated 
as well (Li and Harris, 2006; Tvaryanas et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008). 
2.8 Findings from HFACS Analysis 
As previously stated, HFACS has been adapted and used in a variety of industrial 
settings including aviation, medicine, and railroads. In military, commercial, and general 
aviation industries, skill-based errors have routinely been found to be the leading type of 
unsafe acts (ex. Wiegmann and Shappell, 1997, 2001c; Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003; 
Detwiler et al., 2006; Shappell et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008). In recent research into 
railroad yard accidents, skill-based errors were also the most identified unsafe act 
committed (Reinach and Viale, 2006; Baysari et al., 2008). Skill-based errors have also 
been found to be the most common error form for air traffic controllers (Pape et al., 
2001). When workers in a cardiovascular surgery operating room were interviewed, they 
identified skill-based errors as the most common type of unsafe acts (ElBardissi et al., 
2007).  
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Guar (2005) in a study on civil aviation in India found that over half (52.1%) of 
the accidents examined had at least one contributing factor at the organizational level. 
The most often cited organizational factor was “organizational processes.” Li and Harris 
et al. (2008) also found a substantial number of causal factors at the organizational and 
supervisory levels. In their study on the Republic of China Air Force, “resource 
management” was identified as a causal factor in 35.2% of cases and “organizational 
process” in 14.5% of cases. At the supervisory level, “inadequate supervision” was 
identified in 33.8% of cases. Baysari et al. (2008) found that 44% of all error codes 
identified in rail yard accidents were at the organizational level. These numbers show 
differences from other HFACS studies in which causal factors at the top two levels were 
relatively rare (ex. Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001a; Shappell et al., 2007).  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
3.1 HFACS Framework 
3.1.1 Construction of HFACS-MI 
The framework developed for this study was based off of the version of HFACS 
described by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003). This framework was modified by the 
author with the input of end users to better correlate to the mining industry. The modified 
framework is called human factors analysis and classification system-mining industry 
(HFACS-MI). During training and testing with future HFACS-MI lead users, the term 
“skill-based” error continually caused confusion during coding. To reduce confusion and 
improve performance, the group of future users along with the author renamed the 
category “skill-based errors.” For the preconditions for unsafe acts level, “personal 
readiness” was changed to “fitness for duty” and “crew resource management” was 
changed to “communication and coordination” to keep with terminology familiar 
throughout the mining industry.  
For the unsafe supervision level, all references to “supervision” were changed to 
“leadership.” This change was made due to the vast hierarchy of management at each 
mine site. It was believed that using the word “supervision” would lead users to only 
think about those latent conditions which could be attributed to the operator’s immediate 
supervisor. On large mine sites, there are a number of people who are not direct 
supervisors for operators that make decisions at the supervisor level, such as the Site 
Senior Executive (SSE). These higher-up decisions are not always at the organizational 
level as a single company can control multiple mines across the state and world. The 
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organizational level was left unchanged, but emphasis was made to raters that the 
organizational structure could be global and to remember that decisions at this level are 
not always made at the mine site. A fifth level was added to incorporate influences 
outside of the organization and is based off of the work of Reinach and Viale (2008) with 
the railroads. This level includes regulatory, social, political, environmental, and 
economic influences. The final HFACS-MI framework can be seen in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Human factors analysis and classification system-mining industry (HFACS-MI) framework  
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3.1.2 Description of HFACS-MI Categories  
Unsafe Acts of Operators 
This first level of HFACS-MI describes the unsafe acts of the operator that 
directly lead to an incident/accident. This level is typically referred to as operator error 
and is where most accident investigations are focused. Unsafe acts typically dominate 
accident databases as they are easy to identify and place the blame on a select few people. 
Unsafe acts of the operator are classified into two categories, errors and violations. Errors 
are activities that fail to achieve the desired outcomes whereas violations are activities 
that consciously disregard established rules and regulations. In the HFACS-MI 
framework, errors are divided into three basic types (decision, routine disruption, and 
perceptual) while and violations are divided into two (routine and exceptional).  
Decision Errors. Decision errors represent intentional actions that proceed as 
intended, but the plan proves inadequate or inappropriate for the situation. Decision 
errors occur during highly structured tasks and are divided into three types: rule-based, 
knowledge-based, and problem-solving. Rule-based errors occur when a situation is 
either not recognized or is misdiagnosed, and the wrong procedure is applied. 
Knowledge-based errors occur when an operator chooses between various action plans 
but selects the incorrect procedure for the situation; this can be exacerbated by time 
pressure, inexperience, stress, etc. Problem-solving errors occur when an individual is put 
in a situation where the problem is not well understood, and no formal procedure exists; 
instead, a novel solution is required. During these situations an individual must resort to 
reasoning and thought-processing which is often time consuming and mentally taxing.  
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Skill-based Errors (Routine Disruption Errors). Unlike decision errors, skill-based 
errors occur with little conscious effort during highly automated tasks. As tasks become 
more familiar to an individual, they also become more automated. After some time, it 
does not take much conscious thought for an individual to navigate a car home following 
the same route every day. The skill-based error would arise when the person simply 
drives past his desired turn without noticing. Skill-based errors are due to failures of 
memory or attention. In the example given above, a loss of attention to where the 
individual was going could have led to the error. Failures of attention have been linked to 
breakdowns in visual scanning, task fixation, and inadvertent activation of controls. 
Consider an operator who is busy checking the status of the ground support and activates 
the incorrect control.  
Memory failures often appear as missed steps in a checklist, forgetting intentions, 
or losing one’s place in a sequence of events. Most people can relate to others that go to 
get something only to forget what they went to get. In everyday situations, these failures 
have minimal consequences. In comparison, consider the pedestrian on a mine site who 
forgets to wait for radio confirmation before proceeding into an area with heavy vehicles. 
The consequence of this action could quite literally lead to death. These errors increase 
during emergency situations when stress levels increase.  
Skill-based errors are also caused by the technique employed to carry out a task. 
Even with similar backgrounds in training and experience, the way an individual operates 
equipment can cause an increased likelihood of committing an error. An operator may 
move controls using tactile clues only when deciding which lever to move. When 
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compared with other techniques for operation, such as the added use of visual clues, this 
way could lead to more unintentional errors being committed.  
Perception Errors. Perception errors occur when sensory input is degraded, 
usually in impoverished environments. The error is not the degraded input being used, 
but the misinterpretation of the input itself. In the mining industry, the effect of a 
degraded physical environment has seen very little research. Operators, especially those 
working underground, are often in areas with limited lighting and constantly changing 
ground and rib conditions.  
Routine Violations. Routine violations refer to the willful disregard of rules and 
regulations that are condoned by persons in positions of authority. These violations tend 
to be habitual and accepted as part of what goes on in the organization. Consider, for 
example, the operator who continually drives above the posted speed limit on the haulage 
roads. As this is normal on city roads, many people do not think anything of driving 5-10 
kph over the posted speed. Since this act occurs frequently and there are few adverse 
events as a result, the enforcement of the rule is not a priority. In order to prevent routine 
violations from occurring, one must look to the members of authority to begin enforcing 
all of the rules.  
Exceptional Violations. Exceptional violations are isolated departures from rules 
and regulations. These departures are not condoned by management, nor are they 
indicative of an individual’s behavior. For example, imagine an operator who violated 
regulations by operating a piece of equipment that he or she is not authorized to use. 
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Exceptional violations are difficult to correct because they are unpredictable due to their 
departure from normal behavior.   
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
While the unsafe acts of the operator have continually been linked to accidents, 
the preconditions to the unsafe acts must also be understood in order to reduce 
incidents/accidents. Preconditions are generally latent system failures that lay dormant 
for long periods of time before ever contributing to an accident. Understanding the 
preconditions that an individual is placed under will help identify other areas for 
organizational improvements. Preconditions for unsafe acts include environmental 
factors, conditions of the operator, and personnel factors.  
Physical Environment. The physical environment is often looked at and cited in 
accident databases. The physical environment refers to both the operational (tools, 
machinery, etc.) and ambient (temperature, weather, etc.) environments. Mining 
operations, especially those underground, take place in adverse environmental conditions. 
Miners are often exposed to high temperatures which can lead to a decrease in attention, 
dusty conditions that reduce visibility, and dehydration—all of which can contribute to 
unsafe acts.  
Technological Environment. The technological environment deals with the design 
of equipment and the interaction between operators and equipment. The displays and 
control designs within equipment play a critical part in human error. Within Australia, 
differences in control locations may become a major issue. Most equipment is designed 
and manufactured overseas where standards are different. Even the side on which an 
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operator sits in the truck will change depending on whether the truck was designed based 
on the American standard of drivers sitting on the left, or if the design was modified to be 
driven from the right, as is standard in Australia. This change in seat position can have an 
effect on operators who are inexperienced and unfamiliar with the new layout or who are 
constantly switching between left- and right-hand drive vehicles.   
Adverse Mental State. The adverse mental state of the operator covers a broad 
range of mental conditions that can affect the performance of an operator. These 
conditions include mental fatigue, monotony, distraction, inattention, inherent personality 
traits, and attitudinal issues such as overconfidence, frustration, and misplaced 
motivation. 
Adverse Physiological State. Adverse physiological state refers to medical and 
physiological conditions that affect performance. Physiology refers to the normal 
functioning of an organism—in this case, of an individual person. It may be part of an 
individual’s normal body function to have an overactive sweat gland. While this in itself 
will not preclude safe operation, combined with a hot humid environment and restricted 
water access, dehydration could be a major problem. It is important to identify these 
conditions in order to ensure that actions are taken to ensure individuals are not at an 
increased risk of harm due to medical or physiological conditions. This category also 
covers temporary medical conditions such as colds, headaches, et cetera, and the effects 
of the over-the-counter medications that people take to relieve these conditions.  
Physical/Mental Limitations. While many people are unwilling to admit it, there 
are occupations simply beyond the capabilities of some individuals. All of us cannot 
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aspire to be test cricket players in a week, and similarly may not have the physical or 
mental capabilities to operate complex, heavy-duty machines in often adverse 
environments with limited experience. This category refers to situations when 
individuals’ capabilities are exceeded by the demands of the job.  
This category takes into account many different forms of incompatibility. Some of 
these incompatibilities are possessed by all humans. The human visual system is known 
to be limited in dark environments so precautions must be taken to account for this 
decrease in visual acuity. Other areas of incompatibility are often overlooked simply 
because people do not want to offend others. These incompatibilities are those referring 
to physical and mental aptitude. Some people do not possess the mental aptitude to 
correctly react to novel situations or to memorize different procedures. Some individuals 
lack the physical ability to safely perform a job. This includes not having the physical 
strength to operate the controls, having incompatible anthropometric measurements for 
machines and poor physical health to complete strenuous aerobic tasks.   
Communication and Coordination. Communication and coordination within an 
organization is vital for safe operations. Poor coordination between personnel, 
management, and contractors leads to confusion in responsibilities and overall 
breakdowns in organizational pathways. Communication breakdowns can occur between 
varieties of people within the work site—within workgroups, between workgroups, 
between management and personnel, and between management and contractor.  
Fitness for Duty. It is the responsibility of an employee to arrive for work in a 
condition which allows him or her to work safely. To a large extent, mine sites have 
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taken measures to ensure that workers show up not under the influence of drugs and/or 
alcohol. Unfortunately, other factors play a significant part of being fit for duty. These 
factors include showing up to work with adequate sleep, avoiding physical overexertion 
during free hours, and maintaining a healthy diet. Within the mining industry, shift work 
is very common. Engaging in shift work can lead to poorer sleep patterns and nutrition 
which can negatively affect circadian rhythms and result in lack of fitness for duty.     
Unsafe Leadership  
According to Reason (1990), the actions of people in leadership positions can 
influence the performance and actions of operators. As such, the causal chain in accident 
investigation should include factors at this level. Unsafe leadership is divided into four 
categories: inadequate leadership, planned inappropriate operations, failure to correct 
known problems, and leadership violations.  
Inadequate Leadership. Leadership is responsible for providing personnel with the 
opportunity for safe operation. This is done through adequate training, oversight, 
incentives, guidance, etc. While leadership has the responsibility to provide these things, 
they do not always do so. With training issues, it is up to leadership to arrange and 
authorize training programs. When employees are not given the opportunity to attend 
training sessions, decision making abilities are not developed, potentially leading to an 
increase in decision errors. Oversight is also an important part of leadership 
responsibilities. While it is important to trust the competency of operators, leadership 
must still be present to prevent the breeding of violations within the system.   
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Planned Inappropriate Operations. The category of planned inappropriate 
operations refers to situations where actions are initiated that put personnel at an 
unacceptable level of risk. While these actions may be acceptable during emergency 
situations, they are unacceptable during normal operation. Consider, for example, 
leadership that allows a worker to pick up extra shifts in order to cover poor shift 
scheduling. However, allowing an operator to continue to work after completing a 12-
hour shift will possibly lead to drowsiness and increase the potential for human error.   
Failure to Correct Known Problems. The third category, failure to correct known 
problems, refers to instances where unacceptable conditions or behaviors are identified, 
but actions are not taken to correct them. While most correction measures are left to those 
in authority, instances of unacceptable behaviors are more likely to surface when 
authority figures are not present. It is therefore vital that everyone in the organization 
take an active role in correcting known problems. Inconsistent actions or discipline 
promotes violation of rules and regulations.  
Leadership Violations. The final category, leadership violations, is reserved for 
situations in which established rules and regulations are willfully disregarded by those in 
positions of leadership. Leadership violations are rare in nature, but their effects can 
permeate throughout the organization. When employees witness the mine leadership 
disregarding rules and regulations, a culture is created where following the rules is not a 
priority.  
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Organizational Influences  
Organizational failures can be further traced to deficiencies within the highest 
levels. Latent conditions within the organizational level often go unnoticed during 
accident investigations. These factors are difficult to find unless a clear understanding of 
the organization’s framework is understood, and a consistent accident investigation 
framework is used. Identification of causal factors at this level can also be hindered by 
the unwillingness to apportion blame to the company for fear of liability. Organizational 
influences are divided into three categories: resource management, organizational 
climate, and organizational process.  
Resource Management. The most obvious corporate decisions are those that 
related to the allocation of resources. Organizational resources include equipment, 
facilities, money, and humans. The allocations of these assets are often based on two 
conflicting objectives: safety and profit. Part of resource management deals with the 
allocation and availability of personnel. Failures of resource management can occur when 
an unfavorable ratio of leadership to workers exists.   
Organizational Climate. An organization’s climate refers to a range of variables 
that affect performance, including the organizational structure, culture, and policies. 
Organizational structure is most often viewed as the chain of command that is employed 
within the company. The way that different levels of management and employees interact 
with and relate to one another is all part of the organization’s climate. “Culture” refers to 
the attitude, values, beliefs, and customs that are used as guidance. In many 
organizations, the culture reflects the manner in which tasks are carried out regardless of 
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the rules and policies that should be followed. A company’s policies refer to both the 
written procedures that are used and the unwritten policies that are embedded in the 
organization.    
Organizational Process. The final category of organizational influences, 
organizational process, refers to the decision making that governs the day-to-day 
operations of an organization. Organizational process includes the creation and 
dissemination of SOPs, roster selections, and the establishment of safety programs.  
Outside Factors  
Rarely, if ever, do organizations operate in isolation. Depending on the type of 
work being conducted, an organization will be regulated by a government body. Even 
those that do not have a specific government entity oversight are still required to comply 
with safety and health regulations. Additionally, an organization must answer to the 
community. This fifth and final level of the HFACS-MI framework is not part of the 
original framework developed by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003). It was modeled after 
the work of Reinach and Viale (2006) on problems within the rail industry.  
Regulatory Factors. As a government entity, DME has a responsibility to the 
industry it oversees, as well as workers in the industry. DME is split into many groups, 
but the two main groups dealing with mining are Safety and Health and the inspectorate. 
The inspectorate regulates industry and provides advice and guidance but is not 
responsible for safety. Safety and Health is there primarily for the worker. DME must 
ensure that inspectors and others who interact with industry and unions are seen as 
unbiased, knowledgeable, adequately trained, and competent in their positions. 
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Deficiencies in any of these areas could lead to suboptimal enforcement of legislation and 
inadequate guidance on safety issues and concerns. It is this level of the HFACS-MI 
framework that will allow DME to ensure that its actions do not adversely affect safety 
and health.  
Other Factors. Besides government influences, organizations are faced with a 
myriad of other outside influences as they are pressured by different sources to ensure 
safety and health. The community in which an organization is located might pressure the 
organization to hire locally which could lead to an increase need for training. Legal 
pressure is always a concern as many organizations become fearful of prosecution for 
their actions. Economic pressures could force an organization to increase production, and 
in turn, potentially overwork employees. Pressure from environmental groups could lead 
to changes in procedures and policies which would have to be effectively communicated 
throughout the organization. Changes in the overall surrounding population may have an 
effect on safety and health. Australia, as in other parts of the world, is seeing an overall 
aging of the work force and a decrease of younger workers entering into high-risk 
industries. All of these outside influences have the ability to adversely affect the safety 
and health performance of an organization unless the organization recognizes them and 
takes steps to mitigate their impact.  
3.1.3 Exemplar Development  
Examples of each causal factor were generated to use as a guide during accident 
investigation. The first step involved in developing these examples, or “exemplars,” was 
a brainstorming session with a focus group. The focus group totaled seven people and 
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included inspection officers, mines inspectors, and regional inspectors of mines. All 
members of the focus group worked for the DME and had at least five years of 
experience within the mining industry. Individual and small group non-structured 
interviews were then held between mine operators and a human factors specialist to gain 
more firsthand knowledge of active and latent failures. Mine workers interviewed had 
between less than one year and 20 years experience in the industry. After this list of 
examples was compiled, it was reviewed and categorized by a group of seven people with 
mining experience and a group of four with HFACS experience. Where disagreements 
existed, discussions were held until a consensus agreement was reached. A complete 
listing of exemplars can be found in Appendix A.  
3.2 Data Collection  
3.2.1 Study One- Australia  
Data was collected from mining incident/accident reports obtained from the DME 
in Queensland, Australia. The author collected the data personally at five regional offices 
throughout Queensland, Australia. Mines and quarries in Queensland are divided into 
three separate regions; northern, central, and southern.  
All mines and quarries in Queensland are required to report lost time accidents 
and high-potential incidents to DME within 24 hours of the event. Because of the large 
number of incidents/accidents reported, investigation reports were selected based on the 
following criteria: an initial report was made to DME, a follow up report was submitted 
by the mine, and an accident investigation was conducted by either the mine or DME. In 
total, 508 incident/accident cases occurring from January 2004 to June 2008 were used in 
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the analysis. This represents approximately 10% of the total number of reported events 
during this time frame. Mines involved in the analysis included open cut and 
underground coal mines; open cut and underground metal/non-metal mines; and quarries.  
3.2.2 Study Two- USA   
Data was collected from fatal mining accidents on the MSHA website 
(http://msha.gov/). As these reports are up for public access, no de-identification of 
information was done. As a federal government agency, accidents gathered were from 
mines across the USA. Mines included coal mine facilities and metal/nonmetal mine 
facilities. In total, 254 fatal accident cases were included from 2004-2008.  
3.3 Causal Factor Classification using HFACS-MI 
3.3.1 Study One  
Groups of two human factors specialists were used to code each case by consensus. 
Given the high inter-rater reliability found in previous HFACS analysis (ex.  Pape et al., 
2001; Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003; Gaur, 2005; Reinach and Viale, 2006; Li et al., 
2008), consensus coding was deemed appropriate for analysis. All human factors 
specialists possessed a minimum of a Master’s degree in industrial engineering with an 
emphasis on human factors. All coders were previously trained and certified in the use of 
the HFACS framework and had experience with the application of HFACS in accident 
analysis.  
HFACS-MI codes were identified using the incident narrative, sequence of events, 
recommendations and/or findings. Each HFACS-MI category was counted a maximum of 
one time per case. This count acted as an indication of the presence or absence of a given 
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category for each incident/accident. Subsequent category codes were also classified for 
further analysis. During the coding process, each rater was supplied with copies of the 
HFACS-MI framework and corresponding exemplars. All raters had electronic access to 
incident reports.  
3.3.2 Study Two  
Groups of two human factors specialists were used to code each case by consensus. 
Given the high inter-rater reliability found in previous HFACS analysis (ex.  Pape et al., 
2001; Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003; Gaur, 2005; Reinach and Viale, 2006; Li et al., 
2008), consensus coding was deemed appropriate for analysis. All human factors 
specialists possessed a minimum of a Master’s degree in industrial engineering with an 
emphasis on human factors. All coders were previously trained and certified in the use of 
the HFACS framework and had experience with the application of HFACS in accident 
analysis.  
HFACS-MI codes were identified using the overview, accident description, and 
root cause analysis. Each HFACS-MI category was counted a maximum of one time per 
case. This count acted as an indication of the presence or absence of a given category for 
each incident/accident. Subsequent category codes were also classified for further 
analysis. During the coding process, each rater was supplied with copies of the HFACS-
MI framework and corresponding exemplars. All raters had electronic access to incident 
reports.  
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3.5 Analysis 
Coded data was organized and analyzed using a MICROSOFT ACCESS database and 
MICROSOFT EXCEL. Hypothesis testing was used to compare proportion of errors and 
organizational deficiencies. The following is the general hypothesis that will be tested  
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To test for significance, the chi-squared statistic will be used. The test statistic value for 
testing the hypothesis p1 = p2 is determined from the formula  
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A p-value of 0.05 was used to identify significance. This study looked to minimize Type 
II errors. Type II errors will be minimized to ensure that all significant differences are 
identified. This will be done to increase the chances of finding areas for future 
improvement and to better protect the worker.    
If the results of the chi-square goodness-of-fit test is significant, it can be 
concluded that in the underlying population represented by the sample, there is a high 
likelihood that the observed frequency for at least one of the sub-population is not equal 
to the expected frequency. The chi-square goodness-of-fit test provides an approximate of 
the multinomial distributions. The following are the assumptions that must be met to use 
the chi-square goodness-of-fit test on population frequencies:  
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a. Categorical/nominal data are employed 
b. The data that are evaluated consist of a random sample of n independent 
observations  
c. The expected frequency of each cell is 5 or greater.  
Instances where the third assumption was violated resulted in no statistical test being 
performed. This was due to the extremely small sample sizes. It was believed that no 
meaningful results could be derived from sample sizes that were very small.  
3.6 Case Study  
To clarify the coding process that took place during both studies, an example case 
study will be reviewed. The accident took place at an open pit coal mine on May 23, 
2006 in Kentucky and resulted in the death of a 23-year-old miner with less than one year 
of mining experience. The accident occurred because the service brakes were not 
adequate, the engine brake was inoperative, and the victim was not tasked trained. The 
approved training plan was not followed, and effective procedures were lacking to ensure 
adequate braking systems. Using the overview, the accident description and the root 
cause analysis, HFACS-MI codes were identified for contributing factors for this 
accident.  
The first step in the analysis process was to code the root causes identified by 
MSHA investigators. The first root cause was that management failed to task train the 
victim, and the approved mine training plan was not followed. This was coded at the 
leadership level and fell under the category inadequate leadership. Although the victim 
had training on the operation of a Mack truck, the training he had received was on a truck 
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specifically used to carry explosives. The two trucks, although the same brand, had 
different transmissions; and therefore, the operation of the braking system was slightly 
different. Therefore, the incorrect application of the braking system when the truck 
started to slide down the embankment was coded as a decision error, or more 
specifically, as the incorrect use of equipment. The assignment of an untrained, 
inexperienced driver to operate the water truck by members of leadership was coded as 
planned inappropriate operations.  
The engine brake on the water truck was inoperable at the time of the accident. 
When the victim was given the task of driving the water truck, he was told by his 
supervisor that the engine brake did not work. He was also told to inform the mechanic of 
the problem so that the mechanic might fix it. The problem with the brake not being 
operational had been reported to the supervisor on two previous occasions before the 
accident occurred. Because the problem was known and management failed to see the 
problem corrected, the causal factor was coded as failure to correct known problem. 
There was also a technical environment code as the brakes failed to prevent the water 
truck from sliding down the incline. MSHA investigators also discovered that the 
organization lacked a policy for ensuring that maintenance checks were carried out. This 
lack of procedure was coded at the organizational level and was identified as a failure of 
the organizational process. The final contributing factor to this accident was the 
gradient of the road. The truck began to gain speed while driving down a 9% gradient. 
This contributing factor was coded as a physical environment factor, or more 
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specifically, a surface/road condition. All incidents and accidents were coded in a similar 
manner.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1 Study One: High-potential and Lost Time Accidents/Incidents, Australia 
The results for this analysis identified causal factors at all tiers except for outside 
factors. For both the organizational influence and unsafe leadership tiers, causal factors 
tended to concentrate within a single category. Causal factors at the lowest two tiers were 
dispersed over multiple categories. Table 1 shows the frequency and percentage of 
incident/accidents cases associated with each HFACS-MI category. The percentages at 
each level can add up to more than 100% as more than one category could be associated 
with an individual case. A more detailed analysis of each level is provided in the 
following sections.  
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Table 1: Frequency and percentage of cases- Study One 
HFACS Category N* (%) 
Outside Factors 
Regulatory Influences 0 (0.0) 
Other Influences 0 (0.0) 
Organizational Influences 
Organizational Climate 7 (1.4) 
Organizational Process 42 (8.3) 
Resource Management 5 (1.0) 
Unsafe Leadership 
Inadequate Leadership 144 (28.3) 
Planned Inappropriate Operations  60 (11.8) 
Failed to Correct Known Problems 20 (3.9) 
Leadership Violations 7 (1.4) 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
Environmental Conditions   
Technical Environment 179 (35.2) 
Physical Environment 198 (39.0) 
Conditions of the Operator   
Adverse Mental State 64 (12.6) 
Adverse Physiological State 32 (6.3) 
Physical/Mental Limitations 55 (10.8) 
Personnel Factors   
Coordination and Communication 138 (27.2) 
Fitness for Duty 2 (0.4) 
Unsafe Acts of the Operator 
Skill-based errors 299 (58.9) 
Decision Errors 249 (49.0) 
Perceptual Errors 25 (4.9) 
Violations 28 (5.5) 
* N = 508 
4.1.1 Unsafe Acts of the Operator 
A large amount of data was gathered at the unsafe acts tier. Nearly all cases 
analyzed identified at least one causal factor at this tier (94.7%). The large number of 
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unsafe acts found in the incident/accident reports was not surprising as most reports gave 
a fairly descriptive account of events.  
The following section presents a general analysis of the unsafe acts identified. It 
also provides an analysis differentiating unsafe acts based on mine type, mine material, 
time of day, and year. Age and experience data could not be analyzed as this information 
was only available for a small percentage of cases.    
The most often identified unsafe act was skill-based errors, followed by decision 
errors, and violations. Perceptual errors were identified in less than 5% of cases analyzed. 
At least one skill-based error was identified in 58.9% of cases analyzed. From Figure 8 it 
can be seen that 50% of unsafe act codes identified are associated with skill-based errors. 
Decision errors also account for a large percentage of codes identified. Perceptual errors 
and violations are nearly similar in frequency and when combined account for less than 
9% of codes.  
 
Figure 8: Unsafe acts of the operator percentages of codes 
Unsafe Acts of the Operator
Skill-based error
Decision Error
Perceptual Error
Violation
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In order to standardize the analysis process, examples were created at each 
HFACS-MI category level of typical actions or issues that might occur. These examples 
were then clustered within each category based on underlying similarities. For example, 
“working at heights without fall protection” was grouped with other codes involving the 
misuse or inadequate use of personal protection equipment (PPE). The top three skill-
based errors and decision errors can be seen in Table 2. Violations and perceptual errors 
represented a small percentage of unsafe acts and therefore are not shown here. A 
complete list of the groupings can be found in Appendix A. The percentages of 
incident/accident cases associated with each unsafe act exemplar are displayed in Figure 
9.  
Table 2: Top three routine disruption and decision errors 
Skill-based errors Decision Errors  
Inadvertent or missed operations Procedural errors 
Technique errors Situational assessment errors 
PPE/tools/equipment errors  Risk assessment errors 
 
Exemplars associated with violations and perceptual errors combined represent only 
10.2% of all exemplars identified.  
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Figure 9: Unsafe acts of the operator exemplars 
A closer examination of skill-based errors revealed that the most common types 
of errors were inadvertent/missed operations, technique errors, and PPE/tools/equipment 
errors. Inadvertent/missed operations mainly occurred in the form of a breakdown in 
visual scan or the inadvertent activation of a control. A breakdown in visual scan can 
occur for a number of reasons including distractions and interruptions. However, with the 
large amount of activity on site being conducted at any one time, the visual environment 
can often be overburdened. One intervention aimed at reducing this specific error form is 
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the use of proximity detection units on mobile equipment. The use of proximity detection 
devices may help with reducing instances of vehicle-vehicle interaction especially when 
both heavy and light vehicles are used in close vicinity of each other. One might also 
examine ways to improve vigilance—particularly during times when fatigue and 
boredom may set in, like night-time operations or during repetitive and mundane tasks. 
With inadvertent activation of a control, problems arose from the placement of the 
control and differences in layouts between mobile equipment. To reduce these errors, it 
makes sense to standardize controls and/or reduce the variety of vehicles with different 
control layouts so that switching between vehicles no longer poses a threat. Another 
option would be to introduce warnings or back-up automation that prevents the 
inadvertent/incorrect activation of critical controls.  
An operator’s technique refers to the way in which an operator typically 
completes a task. This technique can cause an increase in an operator’s likelihood of 
committing an error. For example, an operator may get into a practice of calling out when 
entering into an area and not coming to a complete stop while waiting for a response. The 
operator typically gets a response directly after his call out and therefore continues to 
move into the area assuming that the response will come. This “technique,” similar to an 
automobile driver rolling through a stop sign, may increase the likelihood of an adverse 
event occurring.  
Problems with the use of PPE/tools/equipment dealt with the operation of tools or 
equipment and the use of correct PPE. The most frequent activity being performed when 
this type of skill-based error was with the parking of vehicles. When parking either a 
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heavy or light vehicle on site, the engine must be shut off, the parking brake applied, and 
the wheels turned correctly before exiting the cab. It was found that operators often 
exited the cab without completing one of these duties.  
Procedural errors generally refer to the incorrect or misapplication of a given 
procedure for a job. Like any decision making task, it also assumes that the individual has 
knowledge of the procedure. However, an operator may carry out a procedure incorrectly 
simple because he or she does not know the correct steps in the procedure either due to 
lack of training or lack of retention of information. Regardless, these types of errors 
suggest that additional training or procedural aids like checklists or other memory aids 
may prove useful. 
Another common form of decision error observed involved situational 
assessment. That is, assessing whether or not the individual identified the hazard and took 
appropriate action. To increase the likelihood of operators correctly identifying hazards, 
scenario based training that includes visual images of potential hazards has proven useful 
in other high-risk industries, like aviation. A similar training program could be developed 
in mining, albeit at a broader scope. Alternatively, making potential hazards more easily 
identifiable with the use of warnings, barriers, etc. might decrease the occurrence of this 
specific error form.   
Typically, operators are expected to carry out a complete and thorough risk 
assessment and/or job safety analysis before commencing tasks. This includes the 
identification of the necessary controls to either eliminate or mitigate any potential 
hazards that may arise. Unfortunately, the data examined here suggest that many 
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operators did not conduct an adequate risk assessment leading to incidents and accidents. 
While there may be many reasons for this, it is possible that operators have become so 
accustomed to the risk analysis that they have lost sight of its purpose. Consequently, 
they either underestimate the risk or simply fill out the form without giving it sufficient 
thought. This may lead to potentially threatening or unusual (albeit rare) risks to be 
overlooked during the risk assessment process. This is a particularly vexing problem for 
many industrial settings. After all, how does one motivate a person on the front line to fill 
out yet another form when the risks are not necessarily evident or probability of injury 
may not be understood?  
When looking at just skill-based errors, the exemplars “inadvertent or missed 
operation” and “technique errors” appear to be the major contributors as they make up 
32% and 24% of the codes, respectively (see Figure 10). “Postural errors,” which deal 
more with manual handling tasks, represent a very small percentage of skill-based error 
codes. This result may seem to contradict popular belief that manual handling injuries are 
highly associated with industrial tasks. A possible reason for manual handling 
representing a small proportion of HPI and lost time accidents may be that these types of 
injuries are gradual; therefore, they do not necessarily occur as a single accident but 
rather as the result of years of work. That being said, there might not be an “accident” or 
“incident” as defined within regulations to report. Another possible reason for few 
manual handling accidents/incidents is the decrease of manual handling due to the 
increase mechanization of most tasks on a mine site.  
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Figure 10: Skill-based errors- breakdown of exemplars 
Decision errors are associated with 49.0% of all incident/accident cases analyzed 
and represent 41% of unsafe act codes identified. As can be seen in Figure 11, 
“procedural” errors are the major contributor to decision errors at 29%. “Situational 
assessment” also heavily contributes to decision errors at 22%. “Electrical errors” and 
“other decision errors” contribute very little to decision error codes at only 2% each.     
 
Figure 11: Decision errors- breakdown of exemplars 
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The majority of violations (62%) can be attributed to the “procedural” violations 
exemplar. Twenty-one percent of violations can be attributed to the exemplar “PPE 
usage.” Even though violations contribute to a small percentage of unsafe acts overall 
(5.5%) they need to be investigated given their serious nature.  
 
Figure 12: Violations- breakdown of exemplars 
 
While perceptual errors only contributed to 4.2% of all codes at the unsafe act 
level, the classification of these errors is still relevant. The majority of perceptual errors 
(52%) can be attributed to the “misjudgement” of height, distance, speed, or weight (see 
Figure 13). More importantly, 72% of cases where a perceptual error was identified also 
identified the physical environment as a contributing factor. Given this, to decrease the 
frequency of perceptual errors, the physical environment—specifically “visibility” and 
“road/surface conditions”—would need to be improved.    
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Figure 13: Perceptual errors- breakdown of exemplars 
 
Unsafe acts were examined further by mine type. Five basic mine types were used 
in this analysis; underground metal/non-metal mines, underground coal mines, open cut 
metal/non-metal mines, open cut coal mines, and quarries. Since all incident/accident 
cases were attributed to a particular mine, the entire data set was used in this analysis. 
Figure 14 presents the breakdown of unsafe acts for all mine types.  
Skill-based errors were the most prevalent error form and were generally stable 
across all mine types with the noted exception of underground metal/non-metal mines; 
although, the latter was not significant (χ2 = 4.37, ns). This result suggests that 
differences in environmental factors and mining techniques do not affect the likelihood 
that operators will commit skill-based errors.  
Unlike skill-based errors, decision errors did significantly differ across mine types 
(χ2 = 10.39, p < 0.05). For example, underground coal mines had the lowest percentage 
(23.1%) of incident/accident cases associated with decision errors while quarries yielded 
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the highest percentage (48.0%). The larger issue is why decision errors are more frequent 
at quarries than any other mine type. Decisions are based on three key elements: 1) 
information – is the information accurate and timely; 2) knowledge – does the individual 
have the required understanding of the situation and training to make the decision, and 3) 
experience – with experience comes a better understanding of one’s decisions. If any of 
these three components are absent or lacking, the likelihood of successful decision 
making is markedly reduced. Given that, it could be that the information available to 
quarry miners may be suspect or absent. Likewise, the knowledge base of the quarry 
miners may be less than other mine operations for a variety of reasons (i.e., poor training 
practices, more complex tasking, etc.). Finally, it could be that the experience level of 
quarry miners may be less than observed in other mine types. Regardless, successful 
interventions should focus on improving information access and quality while ensuring 
that all quarry miners are provided sufficient training and knowledge to act safely on the 
information. Experience, unfortunately, is something that can neither be taught nor 
substituted for; it merely comes with time. However, depending on the experience level 
of the quarry workforce, these data suggest that efforts to retain and employ more 
experienced quarry miners may be beneficial.  
In contrast to quarries, underground coal mines exhibit a much lower percentage 
of cases associated with decision errors. This may be due to the highly structured nature 
of the tasks coupled with the reality that most operations are associated with written and 
practiced procedures; as a result, employees are never compelled to create their own 
course of action. Also of note, coal mines tend to be populated by a more experienced 
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workforce. One way to measure workforce experience is to look at the retention rate of 
operators. Coal mines exhibit the highest retention rate of all mining sectors in Australia 
(MOSHAB, 2002). This decrease in turnover naturally leads to a more experienced 
workforce.  
For all mine types (except for open cut coal), violations were attributed to more 
cases than perceptual errors. Violations were identified in 5.5% of cases when all the data 
was aggregated. No significant differences exist between violations across mine types (χ2 
= 3.49, ns). In this analysis, it can be seen that open cut coal and underground metal/non-
metal mines have less incident/accident cases associated with violations as a causal factor 
with 3.8% and 4.6% of cases respectively. Overall, underground coal mines have the 
greatest number of cases with a violation as a contributing factor (9.6%).  
Perceptual errors were most often identified with underground coal mines (9.6%). 
Given that the number of underground coal mines analyzed was smaller than any other 
type of mine and the high percentage of perceptual errors present in such mines, it may 
be that the environment at underground coal mines lends itself to create perceptual errors. 
No significant differences in the percentage of cases associated with perceptual errors 
across mine types exist (χ2 = 7.22, ns). Perceptual errors may decrease if the sensory 
environment is improved, for example, by improving the lighting to prevent degraded 
visual cues.  
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Figure 14: Unsafe acts of the operator by mine type 
 
There are two basic categories for mining material used in this analysis, coal and 
metal/non-metal. Metal/non-metal includes a variety of materials such as zinc, copper, 
gold, lead, sand, etc. All 508 cases were used in this analysis.  
When the data is clustered based on mining material, differences in unsafe acts 
are less noticeable (Figure 15). In fact, skill-based errors are nearly identical, as coal 
mines have 59.7% of cases associated with a skill-based error and metal/non-metal mines 
have 58.0% of cases associated with a skill-based error. A non-significant difference (χ2 
= 0.3, p > 0.05) is seen with decision errors. Coal mines had 46.4% of cases associated 
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with a decision error where as metal/non-metal mines had 51.8%. This would suggest 
that operators in coal mines are better at handling abnormal or novel situations quickly.   
Neither perceptual errors nor violations are greatly associated with 
incident/accident cases—regardless of mining material. Perceptual errors, which occur in 
degraded sensory environments, appear to be more often attributed with coal mine 
incidents/accidents than metal/non-metal mine incidents/accidents; however, the sample 
size was too small to perform a meaningful analysis. From the previous analysis on mine 
type, the main contributor of coal perceptual errors was underground coal mines. 
Violations, on the other hand, exhibit the opposite trend and are more often attributed to 
metal/non-metal mining incidents/accidents.  
 
Figure 15: Unsafe acts of the operator by mining material 
 
Data regarding the time of day when an incident/accident occurred was available 
for all cases. Incident/accident event times were sorted into six four-hour groups, and 
these groups were organized based on typical shift times. For example, most 12-hour 
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consists of accidents and incidents in a four-hour time span to ensure that enough events 
occurred for a comparison to be made.  
While in other analyses skill-based errors remained fairly consistent across 
categories, they showed an interaction with the time of day. Skill-based errors are 
identified in a higher percentage of incident/accident cases between the hours of 2200 
and 0159. This time frame generally represents the beginning of a 12-hour night shift and 
occurs during the middle of the circadian trough potentially causing an increase in fatigue 
and a decrease in attention. As skill-based errors generally occur during tasks that are 
repetitive in nature, special consideration should be made to ensure that operators on the 
night shift remain vigilant and engaged in the task at hand. This can be done in numerous 
ways including task rotation, increased communication, and job monitoring. Although the 
percentage of cases associated with skill-based errors appears to vary across time, these 
differences are not significant (χ2 = 7.55, ns).  
No significant difference exist across time periods for decision errors (χ2 = 10.1, 
ns). Decision errors were found to contribute to the lowest percentage (24.0%) of 
incidents/accidents between the hours of 1800 and 2159. From 0600-0959, decision 
errors are also lower than the other time periods. Both of these time periods represent the 
first four hours of a typical twelve hour shift. One possible explanation for the decrease in 
decision errors during these times is that the beginnings of shifts are generally spent in set 
up and briefings. Operators may be engaged in fewer activities and those in which they 
are engaged have recently been explained. If briefings are helping to reduce decision 
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errors during the beginning of the shift, then repeating briefings throughout the shift may 
help to reduce decision errors during other time periods.  
Perceptual errors also showed a trend when viewed by incident time. The 
percentage of perceptual errors are significantly different across time (χ2 = 14.71, p < 
0.05). Fifty-two percent of all perceptual errors identified occurred from 2200-0559. 
About 11% of incidents/accidents that occurred between 2200-0159 and 0200-0559 had 
at least one perceptual error as a contributing factor. During these periods, there is less 
natural light available which could lead to a degraded sensory environment. During the 
time period of 1000-1359, the lowest percentage (0.8%) of cases associated with 
perceptual errors was identified.  
Violations showed a steady trend across time with the highest percentage of cases 
(7.0%) with at least one violation as a contributing factor occurring from 0600-0959. 
Violations did not appear to be a major contributing factor for any one time period. The 
available sample size for violations was too small for analysis.  
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Figure 16: Unsafe acts of the operator by time of day 
Incident/accident date information was available for all cases used in this analysis. 
There are no significant differences in the percentages of skill-based errors, decision 
errors, perceptual errors, or violations from 2004-2008. Shown in Figure 16, skill-based 
errors are the main contributor in all years except 2008 where there is little difference 
between routine disruption and decision errors. Skill-based errors show a slight 
downward trend from 2004-2006, jump up in 2007, and continue to decline in 2008. 
Given the greater number of cases analyzed from 2007, the downward trend exhibited by 
the first three years may simply be caused by fewer incident/accident cases being 
analyzed, and the count for 2007 may be a more accurate representation. This said there 
appears to be is no real reduction in skill-based errors during this time period.  
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There is a decrease in decision errors in 2007, but the percentage of cases in 2005, 
2006, and 2008 are similar. Given the relatively stable rate of decision errors before and 
after 2007, it appears that there is no significant reduction of decision errors exhibited. 
Perceptual errors and violations remained constant over the five-year period analyzed.  
 
Figure 17: Unsafe acts of the operator by year 
Since skill-based errors account for a majority of the unsafe acts, the skill-based 
errors exemplars were analyzed over the five-year time period (Figure 17). The 
inadvertent/missed operation exemplar was the highest occurring exemplar for every year 
except 2005. Inadvertent or missed operations have a noticeable decrease from 2004-
2006, but in 2007 and 2008, they return to previous levels. Technique errors dramatically 
increase in 2005, but in all other years, remain fairly stable. Of note is that all skill-based 
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error exemplars (except for electrical errors) show a decline from 2007-2008. This 
mimics the decline in total skill-based errors over the same period. This suggests that 
there is not a specific type of skill-based error being improved but that there may be an 
overall improvement in errors.    
 
Figure 18: Skill-based error exemplars by year 
During the data collection portion of this project, it became evident that age and 
experience were not readily available for most incidents/accidents. Information on the 
person(s) involved is only required to be provided to DME when there is a lost time 
injury. When date of birth is given, it is only for the person who was injured—not 
necessarily the person attributed with the error. Given this, there was insufficient 
information to analyze unsafe acts based on age and experience. If this is a factor of 
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particular interest to DME, notification and investigation requirements to mines needs to 
be changed to include the collection of age and experience data for all participants in 
each incidents/accidents. 
4.1.2 Preconditions for Unsafe Acts  
A precondition for unsafe acts was identified in 81.9% of cases. The most often 
cited precondition was the physical environment, followed by the technical environment 
and communication/coordination, respectively (Figure 19). Fitness for duty and adverse 
physiological states were the least identified factors and do not appear to be significant 
causal factors.  
Given the harsh and continually changing environment that miners work in, it was 
expected that the physical environment would influence a high percentage of cases. The 
most often cited physical environment exemplar was “surface/road conditions” which 
was a causal factor in roughly 19% of the cases. Of note, 25 out of 45 (55.5%) instances 
of a “slip, trip, or fall” (an exemplar of routine disruptions) also had surface/road 
conditions as a contributing factor. Water on roadways and surfaces is a result of regular 
watering done as part of a dust suppression program. As a result, it is almost impossible 
to remove the slippery surfaces from site. Therefore, this hazard cannot be eliminated 
while still maintaining a healthy level of dust in the air for operators and people in the 
surrounding area. Instead, the consequences of this type of error need to be reduced, i.e. 
decrease severity. Possible ways to decrease the severity include: requiring boots that 
protect against lateral movement; ensuring all boots are well maintained and free of 
build-up on the soles; and install handrails in areas that get slippery or muddy. 
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Figure 19: Preconditions for unsafe acts- breakdown of categories 
Visibility was also frequently identified as a causal factor, contributing to 11% of 
cases. Visibility included instances where there was an absence of adequate lighting and 
when there was glare caused by the sun. A potential way to reduce problems with 
visibility is to place additional portable lighting in work areas that have low lighting. 
Problems with sun glare can be reduced by arranging traffic flow in such a way as to 
reduce driving into the sun or driving where glare is not a problem.   
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Figure 20: Physical environment exemplars 
The technical environment was also highly cited as a contributing factor (Figure 
21). The technical environment includes the availability of warnings, PPE, condition of 
the equipment being used, etc. The most prevalent technical environment exemplar was 
“equipment design/construction.” This exemplar represented 41.7% of technical 
environment exemplars. Causal factors identified dealt with both the design of equipment 
from the original equipment manufacturer and modifications to equipment completed on 
site. Also included were construction issues on the mine site (excluding the construction 
and design of roads). Of interest is that 16.2% of codes at this level involved failures with 
“PPE/guards/safety devices.” Some of these are issues that are government regulated, 
such as the use of guards, and can be corrected with regular inspections.  
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Figure 21: Technical environment exemplars 
As can be seen from Figure 19, communication and coordination problems were 
identified in 21% of cases analyzed. When broken down, 97% of contributing factors for 
this category involved problems with communication. Communication problems can be 
described as failure to make positive communication, inadequate communication of work 
instructions, inadequate communication between workers, etc.  
Adverse physiological state was identified as a causal factor in 6.3% of cases 
analyzed. Included in this HFACS-MI category were operators that fell asleep while 
working. Given this, it appears that fatigue still remains an issue on mine sites. Most 
mine sites have fatigue management plans; however, the effectiveness of these plans 
needs to be reviewed. Workers need to be encouraged to report symptoms of fatigue to 
supervisors, and scheduling needs to be flexible enough to allow workers to be taken off 
the schedule during times of extreme fatigue. When fatigue was reported as a 
contributing factor, it manifested itself as microsleeps, episodes of sleep less than three 
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seconds in duration resulting from sleep deprivation and sleep deficit. Being in a 
microsleep during critical operations can result in missed or tardy responses.    
4.1.3 Unsafe Leadership 
Unsafe leadership was identified in 36.6% of cases analyzed. The majority of 
causal factors (62.3%) at the unsafe leadership level fell into the “inadequate leadership” 
category (Figure 22).  
 
Figure 22: Unsafe leadership- breakdown of categories 
The most often cited exemplar at this level was training—accounting for 28.3% of 
all unsafe leadership codes (Figure 23). Training involves more than just the initial 
teaching of procedures and policies at a mine site. There is also hands-on training, 
refresher training, and training when SOPs change, etc. It is not enough to teach an 
operator once how to perform a task. Retention of material is important, and often a lack 
of retention will lead to mistakes. An operator must have more than just a casual 
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understanding of the material. He or she must be competent and able to take what was 
learned and apply that knowledge in different situations.  
As of June 2002, Beach and Cliff (2003) reported that fly-in, fly-out (FIFO) sites 
in Queensland experienced turnover rates that ranged from 10% to 28%, with an average 
of 21%. They also found that turnover appeared to be higher amongst professional and 
managerial staff. This means that more of the experienced workers were job jockeying; 
one would expect this to affect the training workers’ received. Although this study 
concluded before the analysis of cases in this study began, no major changes in the 
mining industry in Queensland have occurred that would indicate that this trend has been 
counteracted.    
 
Figure 23: Unsafe leadership exemplars 
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 Safety oversight was another highly cited causal factor. With the large size of 
some of the mines in this analysis, a lot of operators are working in isolation. With 
leadership not immediately on hand, workers are unable to quickly ask questions about 
tasks. Some of these questions could be covered by more comprehensive pre-task 
briefings between leadership and operators. This would allow a clearer picture on what 
exactly is to be done. Without consistent monitoring of work, inappropriate behaviors and 
incorrect procedures cannot be identified and rectified immediately.   
4.1.4 Organizational Influences  
Causal factors at the organizational tier were associated with fewer 
incident/accident cases than those at other tiers of HFACS-MI. Only 9.6% of cases 
identified an organizational influence as a contributing factor. The most common 
organization factor was organizational process which accounted for 77.8% of 
organizational codes (Figure 24).  
 
Figure 24: Organizational influences- breakdown of categories 
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The organizational process category was attributed to 8.3% of cases overall. 
Within organizational process, problems with “procedures” were most common (77.2% 
of codes). Problems with procedures mainly dealt with the lack of SOPs or standard work 
instructions (SWI) for a given task. Without adequate instructions, operators are forced to 
develop their own method for completing tasks. While these methods may work, they are 
not always the safest way to perform tasks and could lead to an increase in adverse 
events.  
4.1.5 Outside Factors  
As expected, no causal factors were found at this tier. This result reflects the 
current state of the system in which causal factors attributed to outside of the system are 
not identified. Gathering information at this level will allow for DME to identify areas of 
improvement for itself and employees.   
4.2 Study Two: Fatal Accidents, USA  
Results for fatal accidents in the USA had contributing factors at all five levels of 
HFACS-MI. Results at the organizational influences and unsafe leadership levels once 
again centered on a single category. Uppers levels of HFACS-MI are coded as 
contributing factors in a higher percentage of cases than other analyses have found. Each 
level can add up to more than 100% as more than one causal factor at a single level can 
be identified. Table 3 gives the frequency and percentage of cases associated with causal 
factors at each level. This section will also give a fine grain analysis of each tier of the 
HFACS-MI framework similar to the analysis for study one.  
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Table 3: Frequency and percentage of cases- Study Two 
HFACS Category N *(%) 
Outside Factors 
Regulatory Factors 2 (0.8) 
Other  0 (0.0) 
Organizational Influences 
Organizational Climate 2 (0.8) 
Organizational Process 72 (28.3) 
Resource Management 16 (6.3) 
Unsafe Leadership 
Inadequate Leadership 112 (44.1) 
Planned Inappropriate Operations  33 (13.0) 
Failed to Correct Known Problems 54 (21.3) 
Leadership Violations 13 (5.1) 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
Environmental Conditions   
Technical Environment 85 (33.5) 
Physical Environment 91 (35.8) 
Conditions of the Operator   
Adverse Mental State 3 (1.2) 
Adverse Physiological State 1 (0.4) 
Physical/Mental Limitations 12 (4.7) 
Personnel Factors   
Coordination and Communication 22 (8.7) 
Fitness for Duty 5 (2.0) 
Unsafe Acts of the Operator 
Skill-based errors 111 (43.7) 
Decision Errors 107 (42.1) 
Perceptual Errors 1 (0.4) 
Violations 16 (6.3) 
* N = 254 
4.2.1 Unsafe Acts of the Operator  
For fatal mining accidents in the USA, at least one unsafe act was identified in 
79.1% of cases. This percentage is lower than the percentages found in previous HFACS 
analyses. This reduced percentage of cases associated with unsafe acts may suggest that 
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fatalities are not always a result of human error by the operator but result from failures 
within the system.  
The most often identified unsafe act was skill-based errors, very closely followed 
by decision errors. Perceptual errors and violations were associated with very few fatal 
accidents. The low percentage of violations associated with fatal accidents is contrary to 
previous findings that violations are three times more likely to lead to fatal accidents than 
skill-based errors (Boquet et al., 2004). Boquet, et al. (2004) also found that skill-based 
errors were the least likely error form to be associated with fatal accidents which is 
contrary to the findings from this study. These conflicting results may stem from the 
operational differences between aviation and mining. However, with other accident types, 
aviation and mining exhibited similar trends in unsafe acts.  
When identifying the percentage of cases associated with a particular error form, 
each error form is counted as either absent or present.  When all exemplars at the unsafe 
acts level are analyzed regardless of the presence or absence variable, decision errors 
become the most often identified unsafe act, followed by skill-based errors. This means 
that while more accidents are associated with skill-based errors, more decision errors are 
occurring during fatal accidents. From Figure 25, it can be seen that mining fatalities 
rarely occur as a result of perceptual errors. Given that the percentage of cases associated 
with violations and the percentage of codes associated with violations, it seems that 
single violations—not a series of violations—are causing fatal accidents.   
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Figure 25: Unsafe acts of the operator: fatal accidents 
 
Once again, similar exemplars were grouped together in order to get a more 
accurate representation of the data. When exemplars were combined in this fashion, the 
top exemplars associated with fatal accidents were decision errors. A complete listing of 
the percentage of exemplars associated with fatal accidents can be found in Figure 26. 
Procedural errors refer to the operator’s following and usage of SOPs for completing 
tasks. Operators need to have knowledge of the procedure in order to apply the procedure 
correctly. PPE/Equipment/Tools generally dealt with the incorrect use or use of defective 
equipment, tools, or PPE. A technique error refers to the way in which in operator 
completes a task. The way in which an operator carries out a task can lend itself to an 
increased risk of errors. Electrical errors generally resulted from operators working on 
live electrical equipment. Working on live equipment means that the operator failed to 
lock out and tag out the equipment before commencing work. It is surprising that so 
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many electrical errors occur as lock out/tag out is a federally mandated safety 
requirement. Decision errors arise when operators are unaware of how to lock out/tag out 
equipment, unaware they need to lock out/tag out, or incorrectly locked out/tagged out 
equipment.    
 
Figure 26: Unsafe act exemplars  
 
When looking at just skill-based errors, technique errors and inadvertent or 
missed operation account for nearly 50% of all skill-based error exemplars (see Figure 
27). Surprisingly, 10% of fatal accident cases and 5% of the total number of unsafe acts 
exemplars were associated with a slip, trip, or fall. While these fatal accidents included 
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the more typical types of industrial fatalities, such as falling from ladders, other errors 
included falling into machinery and tripping on the mine floor causing traumatic injuries. 
Electrical errors mainly dealt with the isolation of the incorrect equipment or the 
incorrect isolation of equipment, i.e. forgetting to lock out machinery before working.   
 
Figure 27: Skill-based errors- breakdown of exemplars 
 
Decision errors are associated with 42% of all fatal accident cases analyzed and 
represent almost 49% of all unsafe act exemplars. As seen in Figure 28, procedural errors 
are the most often cited decision error. The incorrect use of PPE, tools, and equipment 
was also frequently cited. When risk assessment was cited as a causal factor, it usually 
meant that operators were unable to identify potentially hazardous environments, and in 
turn, safeguard against hazards. Information processing and prioritization errors were 
cited rarely.  
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Figure 28: Decision errors- breakdown of exemplars 
 
Violations only contributed to 6.3% of all fatal accident cases. When violations 
are looked at more closely, procedural violations and PPE usage accounted for almost 
44% each of all the violations identified. “Procedural” violations refer to the intentional 
disregard of established SOPs and regulations. The difference between a procedural 
decision error and a violation is that with the violation, the operator knowingly went 
against established procedures; they were aware of how the procedure was to be carried 
out and consciously decided against it. PPE usage refers to fatal accidents that result from 
an operator failing to wear the correct PPE, such as helmets, gloves, and harnesses.  
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Figure 29: Violations- breakdown of exemplars 
 
Only a single perceptual error was identified in the analysis of fatal accidents. As 
a result, perceptual errors were removed from further analysis.  
There are five different locations analyzed in this study: underground metal/non-
metal mines, underground coal mines, open cut metal/non-metal mines, open cut coal 
mines, and preparation plants. Figure 30 shows a breakdown of unsafe act causal codes 
by mine types.  
Skill-based errors were fairly stable across mine types but were attributed to fewer 
fatal accidents at preparation plants. This reduction in the percentage of cases attributed 
to skill-based errors was significantly different then the other locations (χ2 = 10.06, p < 
0.05). Tasks performed at preparation plants are different than those performed at mine 
sites. Preparation plants are highly automated facilities that prepare coal and metals/non-
metals for delivery to refineries. Work at preparation plants involves monitoring and 
maintaining equipment.  
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Decision errors exhibited similar results across mine types as there were no 
significant differences between mine types (χ2 = 8.16, ns). At preparation plants, 
decision errors are twice as likely to occur as skill-based errors. This large difference 
between skill-based and decision errors suggests that workers at preparation plants are 
not often involved in automated tasks, and those workers are not able to handle situations 
that are out of the ordinary. At open cut metal/non-metal mines, decision and skill-based 
errors were identified in the same number of fatal accidents.   
Violations exhibited a significant difference across mine types (χ2 = 10.99, p < 
0.05). At underground metal/non-metal mines, no fatal accidents were attributed to a 
violation. A possible explanation for no fatal accidents being attributed to violations is 
that only 24 fatal accidents occurred at underground metal/non-metal mines during this 
analysis. This low number of cases might explain the differences. The other mine types 
that had a low number of cases exhibited a higher percentage of cases with a violation as 
a causal factor. With mine types that have a larger sample size, the percentage of cases 
associated with violations become more stable at around 6-7%.     
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Figure 30: Unsafe acts of the operator by mine type 
Mining material was broken down into two basic types, coal and metal/non-metal. 
Metal/non-metal mining material includes, gravel, sand, gold, zinc, copper, etc. When 
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difference between coal mines and metal/non-metal mines (χ2 = .16, ns). This means that 
while there is a difference between the environments, hazards, and tasks at coal mines 
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errors.    
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susceptible to errors based on a lack of knowledge or training as operators at metal/non-
metal mines. Given that both mining materials have decision errors associated with over 
40% of accidents/incidents, both coal and metal/non-metal mines need to make 
improvements in knowledge transfer and retention.  
Violations were identified as contributing factors in 8% of fatal accidents at coal 
mines, whereas metal/non-metal mines identified violations in only 5% of fatal accident 
cases. This difference was not found to be statistically significant (χ2 = .69, ns). 
Although the difference is not significant, having 5-8% of cases associated with 
violations still points to problems with the disregard of rules, procedures, and regulations. 
In order to correct violations, managers and supervisors need to enforce rules and ensure 
operators follow SOPs.  
 
 
Figure 31: Unsafe acts of the operator my mining material 
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Time of day was broken down into six four-hour time blocks. These time blocks 
correspond to the start, middle, and end of a typical 12-hour shift. Skill-based errors, 
decision errors, and violations were each broken down by time of day.  
Skill-based errors showed no significant difference across times (χ2 = 6.51, ns). 
Regardless of significance, skill-based errors were found to contribute to the highest 
percentage of cases from 2200 to 0200. This time period also represents the beginning of 
the circadian trough. Alertness levels are lowest and fatigue levels are highest during the 
circadian trough which can lead to a decrease in attention, potentially causing an increase 
in skill-based errors.   
Unlike skill-based errors, decision errors were significantly different across time 
of day (χ2 = 36.2, p <0.5). Decision errors were identified in the lowest percentage of 
cases from 0200 to 0600 with only 11% of cases associated. This time period represents 
the end of a typical night shift. It appears that during this time period, workers are not 
encountering tasks for which they do not have SOPs, or they are able to determine the 
correct course of action. Alternatively, decision errors were associated with the highest 
percentage of cases from 1800 to 2200.  
Violations also exhibited a significant difference across mine types (χ2 = 27.8, p 
<0.5). Violations were associated with the highest percentage of cases from 2200 to 0200. 
One possible reason for this increase (18.8% of cases associated) in violations may be 
that fewer operators are scheduled to work during this time period. As a result, operators 
may more often be working in isolation or with fewer supervisors available. Without a 
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member of leadership present to enforce rules and regulations, it may be tempting for 
operators to take shortcuts.   
 
Figure 32: Unsafe acts of the operator by time of day 
 
To determine what affect, if any, that introduced interventions had on human 
factors issues, unsafe acts were analyzed annually. Like results from previous temporal 
trends, skill-based errors and decision errors showed no significant differences across 
years (χ2 = 1.4, ns and χ2 = 1.8, ns, respectively). These results suggest that regulatory 
changes and organizational interventions introduced before or during the time of this 
study had no affect on routine disruption or decision errors.     
Unlike errors, violations showed a significant difference across the time period of 
this study (χ2 = 24.4, p < .05). During 2004, violations were identified in a markedly 
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higher percentage of cases then during any other year. In order to determine if there really 
was a decrease from 2004 to 2005 or if 2004 was just an abnormality, data prior to 2004 
needs to be analyzed. If violations associated with fatal accidents have indeed declined, 
then the interventions introduced that resulted in the identified decline need to be 
continually enforced and improved to see continuous improvement.  
 
Figure 33: Unsafe acts of the operator by year 
 
4.2.2 Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
Preconditions for unsafe acts were identified in 66.1% of cases analyzed. The 
most often identified precondition was the technical environment, followed by physical 
environment, and communication/coordination (Figure 34). Adverse physiological state 
and adverse mental states were the least identified contributing factors.   
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Figure 34: Preconditions for unsafe acts- breakdown of categories 
The physical environment was identified as a contributing factor in 40.7% of 
cases analyzed. This is not surprising given the harsh conditions, particularly 
underground, in which miners work. Ground support—a very important issue for 
underground mines—was the most often identified physical environment exemplar. In 
order to protect workers from cave-ins and shifts of ground, ground support must be 
installed in all areas where conditions “indicate that it is necessary” (30 CFR 57.3360). 
The lack of or inadequate installation of ground support leads to workers being put at an 
increased risk due to additional hazards. Given the critical importance of ground support, 
it is vital that workers are trained to identify hazardous ground support, and improved 
monitoring techniques need to be employed.     
Problems with surface and road conditions were also a highly identified physical 
environment exemplars. Slippery road conditions along with inadequately designed roads 
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were the most often identified surface/road condition problems. Along with ground 
support, these exemplars accounted for over 50% of all physical environment 
contributing factors identified. 
 
Figure 35: Physical environment exemplars 
 
Half of the technical environment exemplars identified dealt with equipment and 
tools. Most problems arose as a result of defective or poorly maintained tools and 
equipment. The responsibility for ensuring that adequate equipment is available and used 
belongs to both the workers and management. It is the workers’ responsibility to inspect 
equipment before use and tag equipment “out of service” if necessary. It is the 
responsibility of management to ensure that routine maintenance is scheduled and carried 
out, proper equipment is ordered and available to workers, and that defective equipment 
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is removed from service. Failure on anyone’s part could result in problems with tools and 
equipment.  
Also highly cited as a contributing factor within the technical environment were 
PPE/guards/safety devices. The technical environment not only monitors the suitability of 
PPE, but also the availability and appropriateness. In order to best protect workers, PPE 
needs to be provided that meets the standards for protecting against all known hazards. 
For example, requiring workers to wear boots might not be enough when there is the 
potential hazard of tools and other material falling onto their feet. It is more appropriate 
in this instance for boots with steel caps to be required.     
 
Figure 36: Technical environment exemplars 
 
4.2.3 Unsafe Leadership 
Unsafe leadership was identified in 63.8% of fatal accidents analyzed. The 
majority of causal factors at this level fell into the inadequate leadership category (Figure 
37). Failure to correct a known problem was also a highly cited causal factor at this level.  
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Figure 37: Unsafe Leadership- breakdown of categories 
 
When unsafe leadership was examined more closely, safety oversight (an 
exemplar of the inadequate leadership category) was found to be the most often identified 
exemplar at this level, accounting for about one quarter of all unsafe leadership codes 
identified. Safety oversight encompassed issues relating to safety walk-throughs, 
leadership’s creation of risk assessments, and leadership’s enforcement of safety. The 
biggest problems with safety oversight resulted from operators working in isolation, 
meaning that there was minimal monitoring of operator work practices, ultimately 
leading to unsafe or inappropriate work practices not being identified or corrected.   
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Figure 38: Unsafe leadership exemplars 
Training was also a highly cited unsafe leadership exemplar in the inadequate 
leadership category. Issues with training were primarily focused on the initial training of 
workers. This inadequate training can lead to a lack of the knowledge base required to 
successfully and safely work on a mine site. Without sufficient knowledge of SOPs, 
rules, and regulations, workers can be at an increased risk for committing errors.  
4.2.4 Organizational Influences  
Causal factors at the organizational level were less often identified than factors at 
lower levels. Organizational influences were identified as a contributing factor in 33.5% 
of fatal accident cases analyzed. As can be seen in Figure 39, organizational process 
accounted for the majority of codes identified at this level. This category was identified 
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in 28.3% of cases analyzed. Within this category, 86.5% of codes were under the 
exemplar “procedures.” This exemplar dealt with the establishment, updating, and 
implementation of SOPs. Without adequate and up-to-date procedures, work processes 
are left up to the discretion of the operator. This is particularly harmful when 
inexperienced operators are forced to develop their own plans. These undocumented 
plans may not be the safest way to perform the task. This in turn can cause an increase in 
the likelihood of mistakes and result in adverse events.     
 
Figure 39: Organizational influences- breakdown of categories 
  
4.2.5 Outside Factors 
Once again, outside factors were rarely identified; only two instances of outside 
factors were identified in the 253 fatal accidents analyzed. Both instances of outside 
factors were identified as regulatory factors. In one instance, at Sago mine in West 
Virginia, the MSHA had issued 208 citations in the based year; 96 of these violations 
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were considered significant and substantial. While MSHA ordered operations ceased in 
the affected area, a mine with such a large number of violations combined with an 
accident rate substantially higher than the national average (17.04 and 5.66 respectively) 
should have signaled to MSHA inspectors that serious problems existed at the mine and 
required more attention.  
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CHAPTER 5: COMPARISON OF FATAL VS. NON-FATAL  
When discussing the differences identified between fatal accidents in the USA 
and non-fatal accidents in Queensland, Australia, there are a few caveats that must be 
presented. The most important point to note is that data was collect from two different 
sources. While both sets of data were collected from government sources, the writers and 
investigators for the cases differ. Reports analyzed from the USA were written and 
investigated by MSHA employees. Reports analyzed from Australia were written and 
investigated by mine safety personnel. In both cases, biases can occur. When mine 
personnel investigate an incident, they may be reluctant to place blame on the 
organization and therefore find fewer contributing factors at higher levels of HFACS-MI. 
When outside personnel lead the investigation, they tended to be more focused on 
organizational issues and stayed away from blaming the operator.  
Another issue with comparing fatal and non-fatal accidents is the depth of 
investigation that took place. As a result of the severity and cost associated with fatal 
accidents, they tend to be more fully investigated. With more thorough investigations, 
more causal factors tend to be identified and therefore more HFACS-MI categories can 
be coded.    
5.1 Unsafe Acts of the Operator  
The unsafe act of the operator is the action that occurs immediately prior to an 
adverse event. By comparing the results from study one and study two, differences in the 
actions of the front line operator that cause a fatal accident versus a non-fatal accident 
can be identified (Figure 40). An unsafe act was identified in far fewer fatal accidents 
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then non-fatal accidents (79.1% and 94.7% respectively) though this difference was not 
significant (χ2 = 1.4, ns). This difference suggests that fatal accidents are not always the 
result of an incorrect action on the part of the operator. It also implies that nearly one in 
five fatal accidents are the result of a culmination of events and the fatal operator was 
merely in the wrong place at the wrong time.  
 
Figure 40: Percentage of cases for fatal and non-fatal accidents 
For both fatal and non-fatal accidents, the most often identified causal category at 
the unsafe acts level was skill-based errors. Although fatal accidents had fewer cases 
associated with unsafe acts, the percentage of cases associated with skill-based errors is 
not significantly different than that of non-fatal accidents (χ2 = 2.25, ns). Within skill-
based errors, the top two exemplars—missed/inadvertent operations and technique 
errors—were the same for both fatal and non-fatal accidents.  
Where differences did exist within skill-based errors, they were with less 
frequently identified exemplars such as electrical errors and knowledge-base errors. Both 
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of these exemplars accounted for almost twice as many skill-based error codes for fatal 
over non-fatal accidents. This is not surprising as electrical errors create an increased 
potential for severe accidents including electrocution. 
The percentage of cases associated with decision errors was also not significantly 
different for fatal and non-fatal accidents (χ2 = 0.52, ns). The most often identified 
decision error exemplar for both fatal and non-fatal accidents was procedural errors. For 
fatal accidents, PPE/equipment/tools was the second most frequently identified exemplar 
accounting for one-quarter of all decision errors. For non-fatal accidents, this exemplar 
only accounted for only 17% of codes. This exemplar includes the use of adequate and 
appropriate PPE. PPE is used as the last means of defense in controlling for hazards. 
Without the proper use of required PPE, the last defense available to operators is missing. 
With non-fatal accidents, situational assessment was the second most identified exemplar 
(22%). This means that operators involved in non-fatal accidents were unable to identify 
where a hazardous condition existed. With fatal accidents, this exemplar accounts for 
only 10% of decision error codes. This implies that the inability to identify hazardous 
conditions is twice as likely to cause an injury as a fatality.  
Violations did not show a significant difference in the associated percentage of 
cases between fatal and non-fatal accidents (χ2 = 0.05, ns). For both fatal and non-fatal 
accidents, procedural violations were the most often identified exemplar. This exemplar 
refers to operators knowingly disregarding the standard operating procedure for a task. It 
implies that the operators know the correct way to execute the given task but took a 
shortcut instead. With fatal accidents, PPE usage was identified in the same percentage of 
 102 
 
accidents as procedural violations. Similar to the results from decision errors, the lack or 
inadequate use of PPE increased the likelihood of fatalities. This suggests that the use of 
PPE as a control against hazards is vital to worker safety.  
As fatal accidents have fewer cases associated with an unsafe act but maintain a 
similar percentage of cases associated with a specific error form, it may suggest that fatal 
accidents tend to have multiple unsafe acts as causal factors whereas non-fatal accidents 
more often result from a single unsafe act. This implies that while operators may be able 
to recover from a single unsafe act with injury or property damage, multiple unsafe acts 
are more difficult to recover from and lead to severe injuries, sometimes causing death. In 
order to reduce fatalities, operators need to be able to correctly recover from the first 
error in order to not create a string of unsafe acts from which they are ultimately not able 
to recover.    
5.2 Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
When preconditions for unsafe acts are present, operators may be more 
susceptible to unsafe acts. A precondition was associated with 66.1% of fatal accidents 
compared to 81.9% of non-fatal accidents. These results suggest that preconditions are 
more often associated with non-fatal accidents than fatal accidents, but this difference is 
not significant (χ2 = 1.6, ns).  
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Figure 41: Preconditions for unsafe acts- fatal vs. non-fatal accidents 
 
The most often identified precondition for both fatal and non-fatal accidents was 
the physical environment as both accident types had over 35% of cases associated with 
this causal category. For non-fatal accidents, the most often identified exemplar was 
surface/road conditions which generally lead to slips, trips, or falls. In contrast, ground 
support issues were most often identified with fatal accidents. Problems with ground 
support can lead to operators working under unsupported ground, cave-ins, and loose 
rocks. While the physical environment was identified as a highly contributing factor in 
both fatal and non-fatal accidents, the types of physical environment exemplars and their 
associated severity greatly affected the accident consequences.   
Similar to the physical environment, the technical environment category was not 
associated with a significantly different percentage of cases for fatal and non-fatal 
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accidents. Within the technical environment, the most often identified exemplars were 
different between fatal and non-fatal accidents. Equipment design and construction was 
the most often identified exemplar for non-fatal accidents, whereas PPE/equipment/tools 
was the most often identified exemplar for fatal accidents. These results suggest that there 
might be exemplars within each category that are more likely to result in injuries/near 
misses or fatalities.  
Instances where significant differences between fatal and non-fatal accidents were 
found are with communication (χ2 = 9.5, p < .05) and adverse mental state (χ2 = 9.4, p < 
.05). Both of these categories were associated with fewer fatal accidents than non-fatal 
accidents. There may be a variety of reasons for these findings. First, it may be easier to 
identify adverse mental states in non-fatal accidents because operators involved can be 
directly questioned about any mental states that might have altered his/her performance. 
Second, the majority of non-fatal accidents involved direct interactions between operators 
and/or vehicles, whereas with fatal accidents, operators were generally by themselves. 
This suggests that in instances of non-fatal accidents, workers tended to have more 
opportunity for communication; therefore, the lack of communication may be more often 
noticed and identified as a contributing factor.  
5.3 Unsafe Leadership  
Unlike the lower two tiers of HFACS-MI, the unsafe leadership category was 
associated with a significantly different percentage of cases for fatal (63.8%) and non-
fatal (36.8%) accidents (χ2 = 7.4, p < .05). Leadership factors were identified with more 
fatal accident cases than non-fatal cases. This may be due to the differences in the reports 
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gathered for this analysis. This may also result from more upper tiered causal factors 
contributing to fatal accidents. If fatal accidents are indeed more likely associated with 
leadership factors, then efforts to improve leadership roles and responsibilities need to be 
made.   
 
Figure 42: Unsafe leadership- fatal vs. non-fatal accidents 
Inadequate leadership was the most identified category for both fatal and non-
fatal accidents within this tier. Differences between fatal and non-fatal cases were not 
significant (χ2 = 3.4, ns). Within this category, the leading exemplar for fatal accidents 
was safety oversight, and for non-fatal accidents, it was training. This implies that people 
are injured or involved in near misses as a result of inadequate knowledge, whereas 
people are killed by a lack of monitoring by experienced personnel.  
Significant differences existed at the unsafe leadership level with the causal 
factor, “failure to correct known problems” (χ2 = 12.1, p < .05). The percentage of fatal 
accidents associated with this causal factor was five times more than that of non-fatal 
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accidents. Members of leadership have an obligation to correct known problems on site 
before allowing an employee to work in hazardous areas or with defective equipment. It 
appears that before a fatal accident occurs, operators are already at an increased risk of 
being involved in an adverse event as a result of the faulty conditions in which they are 
working.  
5.4 Organizational Influences 
Similar to unsafe leadership, organizational influences were associated with a 
significantly higher percentage of fatal (33.3%) accident cases then non-fatal (9.6%) 
accident cases (χ2 = 13.3, p < .05). In fact, the percentage of fatal accident cases 
associated with organizational factors was three time higher than that of non-fatal 
accidents (Figure 43).    
 
Figure 43: Organizational influence- fatal vs. non-fatal accidents 
Within organizational influences, organizational process was the most often 
identified causal category for both fatal and non-fatal accidents. There were significantly 
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more fatal accident cases associated with organizational process than non-fatal accident 
cases (χ2 = 10.9, p < .05). Within this category, problems with organizational procedures 
were most often identified. Given that inadequate procedures (or lack thereof) are 
associated with a high percentage of fatal accidents, it appears that improvements in 
SOPs are needed in order to reduce mine site fatalities. It is vital that not only there be 
SOPs, but that these procedures also be updated, disseminated to workers, and reflect the 
safest operating practices.  
Overall, it appears that organizational deficiencies are more likely to result in fatal 
accidents than non-fatal accidents. This said, interventions should be developed and 
implemented to see a reduction in fatal accidents for identified problems at this tier of 
HFACS-MI.            
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS  
6.1 Findings 
While it was known that human error plays a significant role in mining incidents 
and accidents, the specific types of human error had not yet been identified. These studies 
showed that the HFACS-MI framework could be used to systematically identify 
underlying human factors causes in mining incidents and accidents. Results suggest that 
fatal accidents are more highly associated with higher tiers of the HFACS-MI framework 
than non-fatal accidents.  
At the lowest tier of HFACS-MI, skill-based errors were associated with the 
highest percentage of cases for both fatal and non-fatal accidents. While the percentage of 
cases associated with skill-based errors was not significantly difference between fatal and 
non-fatal accidents, the specific form of skill-based error did differ. The majority of 
causal factors at the precondition for unsafe acts tier dealt with the physical and technical 
environment. While there was no significant difference between the overall percentage of 
fatal and non-fatal cases associated with a precondition, non-fatal accidents were 
associated with a significantly higher percentage of cases for the adverse mental state, 
and communication and coordination categories.  
At the leadership tier, fatal accidents were associated with a significantly higher 
percentage of leadership causal factors than non-fatal accidents. Like the leadership tier, 
organizational influences were also associated with a significantly higher percentage of 
fatal accidents. Results suggest that fatal accidents are a result of higher level system 
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deficiencies whereas non-fatal accidents result from lower level operator error and 
environmental conditions.  
While differences in the percentage of cases associated with causal categories at 
the lowest two tiers of HFACS-MI did not exist between fatal and non-fatal accidents, 
within these categories, the specific exemplars identified differed between fatal and non-
fatal accidents. Differences showed that although the same error forms are identified, the 
underlying causes of fatal and non-fatal accidents are different.   
In addition, these studies identified temporal trends amongst mining incidents and 
accidents. The trends revealed that human error interventions adapted prior to or during 
the research period were not targeted at a specific human error form. Instead, it appears 
that the best interventions targeting human factors were much more general and 
ubiquitous in their impact.  
Another benefit of these analyses is that they can be compared with other mining 
operations worldwide. In other words, results should transfer to the rest of Australia and 
other countries that have similar cultures and regulations. For instance, underlying causal 
factors for fatal accidents in the USA should transfer to those for fatal accidents in 
Australia.  
 Finally, some of the results from this analysis were similar to those found from 
other industries such as aviation and rail (e.g. Shappell and Wiegmann, 2001; Reinach 
and Viale, 2006; Shappell et al., 2007). In other industries analyzed using  One of the 
biggest differences between the findings from this study and previous studies involving 
HFACS is that violations were not associated with as many incidents and accidents. 
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When fatal and non-fatal accidents were compared in previous studies, violations were 
found to be associated with more fatal accidents than non-fatal accidents (Shappell et al., 
2006). In fact, there was no significant difference in the percentage of cases associated 
with a violation between fatal and non-fatal mining accidents.  
By using a structured framework to identify human factors trends, results from 
this study can be compared to those industries as well. This comparison may enable 
safety interventions that proved successful in other industries to be transferred and 
increase cross-industry information sharing. After all, a decision error is a decision error 
regardless of the industry in which it occurs. The underlying causes are still the same, and 
lessons can be learned across seemingly disparate industries.  
6.2 Significance and Contributions 
With the completion of this study, the mining industry, particularly that in 
Queensland, Australia is left with an accident investigation and analysis tool that is based 
on theoretical human factors research and proven to be usably in industry. With a 
structured framework, the mining industry will be able to produce better investigation 
reports including human and system factors, identify causal and contributing factors 
trends, and identify targeted areas for improvements.   
This study revealed the difference in causal factors for fatal and non-fatal 
accidents. Although it was previously thought that violations are more likely to result in a 
fatal accident, this data does not support that thought. Rather, it is now know that 
leadership and organizational factors such as oversight and the development of standard 
operating procedures are more likely to impact the severity of an accident.  
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These analyses provide for the development of data-driven interventions. Since 
different human error forms require different types of interventions, knowing the most 
common error forms will enable safety professionals to develop targeted interventions. 
The results of this study reveal that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to intervention 
development should not be taken. As significant differences were found across mine 
types, time of day, and accident severity, mines need to identify error forms and system 
deficiencies specific to themselves and develop interventions to reduce them. The 
implementation and enforcement of prescriptive standards across all mines might not 
have the anticipated successful results as all mines are not the same. I better approach 
would be to work with problem mines to identify underlying error forms and then 
develop specific interventions to correct them.    
Finally, results from this study established baseline data for future comparison. 
After all, it is difficult to know if a given intervention and/or mitigation strategy had an 
impact on a specific error form if you don’t know what the current problems are. From 
this baseline data, it will be possible to measure the effectiveness of future human factors 
interventions.  
6.3 Future Research  
Ideally, mining organizations will start analyzing their own archival data to 
identify human error forms and associated tasks that are causing adverse events.  The 
next step in continuing this research would then be to work with mining engineers, safety 
personnel, operators, and members of management to develop interventions focusing on 
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reducing the identified human error problems. A structured framework such as the 
Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX) should be utilized to ensure  
Future research also includes the analysis of fatal and non-fatal mining accidents 
from cultures other than those represented here. As previous studies (ex. Li and Harris, 
2005; Al-Wardi, 2006) have found that cultural differences exist between western and 
eastern culture countries, it is necessary to analyze different cultures in order to identify 
where differences exist not only within non-fatal and fatal accidents, but also between 
different severity accidents. This will enable a world-wide initiative to reduce human 
error and system deficiency related mining accidents.  
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APPENDIX A: Exemplars 
 
 
 
Skill-based errors: Errors that occur without significant 
thought based on a response that is highly automated. 
Vulnerable to failures of attention, memory, and/or 
technique.  
Errors 
Slip, Trip or Fall  
Inadvertent or missed operations  
□ Inadvertent operation mechanically induced 
□ Inadvertent operation of incorrect control 
□ Lapse of memory/recall for procedure 
□ Navigational error 
□ Breakdown in visual scan 
□ Failure to recognize self in line of fire 
Postural Errors 
□ Improper position for task 
□ Work or motion at improper speed 
□ Working in awkward posture 
□ Improper lifting 
□ Improper loading 
□ Excessive/over reaching 
□ Physical force exertion 
Timing Errors 
□ Poor coordination or reaction time 
□ Timing error 
□ Task overload 
□ Task interruption 
□ Distraction  
Knowledge-Base Errors 
□ Incorrect application of procedure 
□ Failure to recognize hazard 
Technique Errors 
□ Reversed/omitted steps in a procedure 
□ Safety checklist errors 
□ Inadequate practice 
□ Inadequate performance 
□ Failure to follow posted signs 
□ Failure to wait for response communication 
□ Failure to apply safety device 
□ Improper position/placement of hands 
□ Improper passing maneuver  
Electrical Errors 
□ Improper isolation of equipment 
□ Isolation of incorrect equipment 
□ Unknowingly working on live equipment 
PPE/Equipment/Tools  
□ Improperly prepared/maintained equipment 
□ Failure to use horn  
□ Operating vehicle at incorrect speed 
□ Improper parking 
□ Failure to lower attachments 
Other  
□ Negative habit 
□ Working in incorrect area  
□ Other  
 
Decision Errors: “Honest mistakes,” occur when one 
does not have appropriate knowledge or made a poor 
choice, procedural error or problem-solving error. 
 
PPE/Equipment/Tools  
□ Incorrect use of equipment 
□ Use of defective/incorrect equipment 
□ Improper placement of equipment or 
materials 
□ Operation of equipment at improper speed 
□ Use of improvised tools/machinery/equipment 
□ Exceed equipment capabilities 
□ Working at heights without fall restraint/arrest 
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□ Improper PPE use  
Prioritization  
□ Improper attempt to save time 
□ Failure to prioritize tasks 
□ Necessary action rushed/delayed 
□ Caution/warning ignored 
□ Wrong response to abnormal/emergency 
situation 
Procedural  
□ Improper procedure (i.e. lock out/tag out not 
done) 
□ Inappropriate behavior 
□ Inappropriate maneuver  
□ Failure to take appropriate action regarding 
known hazard 
□ Failure to give way 
□ Failure to properly use communication 
devices 
Information Processing  
□ Misinterpretation of information 
□ Improper decision making  
Situational Assessment  
□ Failure to recognize hazardous conditions 
□ Failure to report/correct hazardous conditions 
□ Failure to report equipment faults/failures 
□ Exceed individual’s capability  
Risk Assessment  
□ Inadequate risk assessment 
□ Risk assessment not completed 
□ Failure to conduct a risk assessment 
□ Failure to perform pre-start inspection 
Electrical Error  
□ Working on live electrical equipment 
□ Improperly working around live electrical 
wires 
Other  
□ Working in unsafe area 
□ Failure to gain authorization before beginning 
task   
□ Working under unsupported ground 
□ Standing in/too close to an open brow 
□ Using unrated anchor points 
□ Inadequate/failure to scale walls 
□ Other 
 
Perceptual Errors: Occur when sensory input is 
degraded and a decision is made based on faulty 
information. 
Misjudgement  
□ Misjudged distance 
□ Misinterpreted/misread equipment 
□ Misjudged speed of object 
□ Misjudged depth/height 
□ Misjudged surface conditions 
□ Under/over estimation of object’s weight 
□ Misinterpreted warnings 
Auditory 
□ Noisy environment leads to misunderstanding 
communication 
Visual  
□ Decrease in visual recognition due to 
inadequate lighting 
□ Failure to identify risk/hazards due to weather 
conditions  
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Violations: Violations involve the break of established 
rules. Violations can be classified as either routine or 
exceptional. Routine violations are habitual deviation 
from the rules and tolerated by management. One must 
look up the leadership chain to identify those in 
authority who are not enforcing rules. Exceptional 
violations are isolated deviations from the rules that are 
not tolerated by management. These violations are 
difficult to predict as they are not indicative of one’s 
behavior.  
PPE Usage  
□ PPE not used 
□ Improper use of PPE 
□ Failure to wear seatbelt 
 
Tool/Equipment Operation  
□ Failure to secure equipments properly 
□ Improper use of equipment 
□ Improper proximity to equipment or vehicle  
□ Operating vehicle/equipment at speeds 
greater than the posted limit 
Procedural  
□ Excessive risk taking 
□ Taking shortcuts 
□ Disregard for SOP 
□ Entry into unauthorized areas 
Knowledge-Based Violations  
□ Violation of training rules 
□ Operating equipment without training 
□ Accepted unnecessary hazard  
□ Disregard of instructions given by SSE 
Other  
□ Disabling of guards/warning signs 
□ Contraband unintentionally  brought onto site 
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Physical Environment: Operational environment and 
ambient environment.  
Environmental Factors 
Ventilation  
□ Inadequate ventilation  
□ Malfunctioning ventilation  
□ Exposure to oxygen deficiency  
Energy  
□ Fire or explosion  
□ Energized electrical equipment 
Inadequate Installation  
□ Controls 
□ Displays 
□ Labels/warning signs 
□ Ladders/stairs 
□ Walking/working surfaces 
□ Guards 
Ground Support 
□ Loose/falling rocks 
□ Inadequate ground control 
□ Corrosion of installed ground control 
□ Incorrectly installed ground control 
□ Incorrectly designed ground control 
Weather 
□ Inclement weather condition  
□ Weather or acts of nature  
Surface/Road Conditions 
□ Slippery floors or walkways 
□ Slippery roadways 
□ LTA road design 
□ LTA road gradient 
□ LTA road maintenance  
Visibility  
□ Restricted visibility 
□ Reduced visibility 
□ Inadequate lighting 
Housekeeping 
□ Clutter or debris 
□ Trip hazard 
□ Hazardous material not contained  
Ergonomic issues  
□ Vibrations 
□ Repetitive motion 
□ Noise interference 
□ Congested or restricted motion  
Miscellaneous 
□ Confined space 
□ Incorrect or uneven tyre pressure 
□ Improper blast hole layout/loading 
□ Build up of gases 
□ Fall/climb hazard  
Technological Environment: (Issues related to design 
of equipment and controls, display/ interface, checklist 
layouts, task factors, and automation)  
PPE/Guards/Safety Device  
□ LTA or defective PPE 
□ LTA or defective guards or protective devices 
□ No guards or protective devices in place 
□ LTA safety device 
□ Safety device missing/not installed 
Warning 
□ LTA or defective warning signs 
□ Missing warning signs 
□ Defective warning signs 
Equipment/Tools 
□ Defective equipment or tools 
□ Dysfunctional equipment or tools 
□ LTA equipment/tool maintenance   
Design 
□ LTA design of control systems/ displays 
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□ LTA design of electrical system 
□ LTA ergonomic design 
□ LTA technical design 
□ Poor man/system interface 
 
 
Adverse Mental State: Mental conditions that affect 
performance.  
Conditions of Operators 
Attitude  
□ Overconfidence 
□ Lack of confidence 
□ Get-home-itis 
□ “It won’t happen to me” attitude 
□ Complacency 
□ Overaggressive 
□ Extreme boredom 
□ Carelessness  
Fatigue  
□ Mental fatigue 
□ Fatigue due to workload (mental) 
□ Fatigue due to lack of rest 
□ Circadian rhythm 
□ Drowsiness  
Psychology  
□ Fears or phobias 
□ Pre-existing personality disorder 
□ Personality style 
□ Pressing 
□ Expectancy 
□ Frustration 
□ Emotional overload 
□ Misplaced motivation 
□ Motivational exhaustion 
□ Stress 
Awareness  
□ Channelized attention 
□ Perceived haste to complete task 
□ Inappropriate peer pressure 
□ Inattention 
□ Degree of attention applied 
□ Task fixation 
□ Task saturation 
□ Confusion 
□ Extreme concentration/ perception demands 
□ Preoccupation with problems 
□ Distraction 
□ Mindset/preconceived idea 
□ Focus/attitude towards task 
□ Tunnel vision 
□ Normalization of risks 
Adverse Physiological State: Medical/physiological 
conditions that preclude safe operation 
Physiological Condition 
□ Spatial disorientation 
□ Visual illusions 
□ Impairment due to drugs or alcohol 
□ Overexertion of physical activities 
□ Sudden incapacitation 
Medical Condition  
□ Medical illness 
□ Dehydration 
□ Inability to sustain body position 
□ Oxygen deficiency 
□ Previous injury or illness 
□ Influenced by medication 
Fatigue  
□ Sleep deprivation 
□ Circadian rhythm/desynchronized 
□ Fatigue due to lack of rest 
□ Fatigue due to workload (physical) 
Physical/Mental Limitations: Situations exceeds the 
capabilities of the operator 
Mental Limitations  
□ Emotional disturbance 
□ Pre-existing psychological disorder 
□ Incompatible intelligence/aptitude 
□ Not familiar with job performance standards 
□ Learning ability limitations 
□ Memory ability/lapses 
□ Inexperience with job task 
□ Limited experience/proficiency 
□ Inability to comprehend instructions, policies, 
etc. 
Sensory Deficiencies 
□ Visual limitations 
□ Vision deficiencies 
□ Hearing deficiencies  
Physical Limitations  
□ Lack of competency 
□ Incompatible physical capabilities 
□ LTA practice of skills 
□ Lack of proficiency 
□ Respiratory incapability 
□ Musculoskeletal disorder 
□ Inability to sustain body movement 
□ Restricted range of body movement 
□ Inappropriate height, weight, size, strength, 
etc. 
□ Motor skill, coordination or timing deficiencies 
□ Uncontrolled body motion 
□ Substance sensitivities or allergies 
□ Temporary disabilities 
Coordination and Communication: Poor 
coordination/communication among personnel.  
Personnel Factors  
Coordination  
□ Failed to use all available resources 
□ Lack of teamwork 
□ Misunderstanding training instructions  
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Communication  
□ LTA communication with contractors 
□ LTA briefing 
□ LTA communication of hazards 
□ LTA communication b/w workers and 
leadership 
□ LTA communication between work groups 
□ Ineffective communication methods 
□ No communication methods available 
□ Misunderstanding of instructions 
□ Standard terminology not used 
□ Incorrect instructions provided 
□ LTA knowledge transfer 
□ Speech interferences 
Fitness for Duty: Failure to prepare mentally or 
physically for duty.  
Fitness for Duty  
□ LTA rest requirements 
□ Self medicating 
□ Use of illicit drugs and alcohol 
□ Hung-over at work 
□ LTA nutrition 
□ Lack of physical fitness 
□ Excessive physical training 
□ Overexertion off duty 
□ Lack of sleep 
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Inadequate Leadership
Guidance  
: A leader may demonstrate 
inappropriate or improper characteristics or actions. 
□ Inadequate performance measures and 
evaluations 
□ Inadequate or incorrect performance 
feedback 
□ Inadequate leadership situational awareness 
□ Inadequate monitoring of work 
□ Leadership inability to manage conflict 
□ Inadequate matching of individual 
qualifications to requirements 
□ Unclear or conflicting assignment of 
responsibility 
□ Failed to provide professional 
guidance/oversight 
□ Lack of accountability 
□ Failed to provide adequate rest period 
□ Crew shortage 
Training  
□ Inadequate assessment of required skills 
□ Failure to track job qualifications/skills 
□ Lack of coaching/training on the job 
□ Training not reinforced on the job 
□ Change introduced without training 
□ Inadequate refresher training provided 
□ Inadequate design of training programs 
□ Inadequate training objectives/goals 
□ Inadequate new hire training 
□ Inadequate on-the-job or departmental 
training 
□ No measurement of training effectiveness 
□ Failure to provide adequate training 
□ Inadequate training on equipment operation 
□ Inadequate training on site characteristics 
□ Inadequate training on SOPs, policies, 
regulations 
□ No training provided 
□ Need for training not identified 
□ Training records incorrect 
□ Leadership decision not to provide training 
□ Failure to provide adequate risk assessment 
training  
Safety Oversight  
□ Inadequate reinforcement of safe behaviors 
□ Failure to conduct safety walk-through 
□ Failure to conduct worksite inspections 
□ Inadequate incident reporting/investigation 
□ Inadequate promotion/enforcement of safety 
□ Inadequate or lack of safety meetings 
□ PPE not available 
□ Failure to ensure individual’s competence 
□ Failure to perform adequate risk assessment 
□ Inadequate implementation of risk 
assessment 
□ Risk assessment completed to meet 
production needs 
□ Risk assessment not based on safety 
□ Lack of quality risk assessments 
□ No internal review of risk assessments 
□ Risk assessments done w/o use of all 
available resources 
Incentives 
□ Lack of appropriate incentives 
□ Failure to reward safe behavior 
Leadership Knowledge/Skill-Level  
□ Inadequate leadership job knowledge 
□ Leadership unaware of risks associated with 
task 
□ Leadership unaware of procedures 
associated with task 
□ Inadequate knowledge base for job 
□ Leadership unwilling to adapt to change 
□ Unqualified/under qualified leadership   
□ SSE inexperience 
□ Failure of SSE to be knowledgeable of 
ongoing operations 
□ Improper leadership example 
□ Inadequate skills/training to perform risk 
assessment 
Procedural, Policy, Oversight 
Unsafe Leadership 
Inadequate 
Leadership 
Planned 
Inappropriate 
Activities 
Leadership 
Violation 
Failed to Correct 
Known Problem 
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□ Inadequate communication of 
policy/procedures 
□ Improper/insufficient delegation of 
responsibilities/duties 
□ Giving objectives, goals or standards that 
conflict 
□ Failed to provide adequate/proper tools for 
the job 
Other 
□ Personality conflict 
□ Leadership unwilling/afraid to confront 
workers 
□ Failed to provide adequate technical design 
Planned Inappropriate Operations: 
Task/Work Plan 
A leader may fail 
to correctly assess the hazards associated with an 
operation and allows for unnecessary risk.  
□ Inadequate assessment of needs 
□ Inadequate standards/specification 
□ Inadequate implementation of company 
policy and procedures 
□ Inadequate communication of company 
policy and procedures 
□ Inadequate equipment 
□ Inadequate maintenance planning/scheduling 
□ Inadequate working plan 
□ Meaningless or degrading activity 
□ Inadequate assessment of required skills 
□ Infrequent opportunities to practice skills 
□ New process introduced without training 
□ Inadequate controls used 
Worker Assignment 
□ Ordered/led job beyond the capability of the 
crew 
□ Excessive workload 
□ Poor shift turnover 
□ Inadequate work turnover process 
□ Poor matching/pairing of crew members 
□ Poor matching of operators to equipment 
□ Failure to provide adequate opportunity for 
break(s) 
□ Failure to provide adequate work/break 
schedule 
□ Failure to provide adequate brief time 
□ Assigning workers to unfamiliar 
situations/tasks/equipment 
□ Allocating the wrong skills for the job/task 
Safety Plan  
□ Failed to conduct accident investigation 
timely 
□ Inadequate hazard assessment 
□ Inadequate safety/hazard inspection system 
□ Inadequate industrial hygiene risk 
assessment 
□ Inadequate initiation of safety review 
□ Inadequate safety records 
□ Inadequate environmental permit 
representation 
□ Risk outweighs benefits 
□ Inadequate reinforcement of safe behaviors 
□ Failure to identify hazards 
□ Risk assessments done in isolation 
□ Failure to sign off on risk assessments 
Leadership Oversight  
□ Failure to provide adequate leadership 
□ Improper/insufficient delegation of authority 
□ Leadership implied haste 
□ Unrealistic expectations 
□ Improper performance is rewarded 
□ Proper performance is punished 
□ Failure to provide appropriate incentives 
□ Lack of contractor communication 
Other 
□ Inadequate instructor qualifications 
□ Inadequate ergonomic design 
□ Inadequate preventive maintenance 
 
Failure to Correct Known Problem: 
Safety/Hazard  
A leader may fail 
to correct a known problem, and the shortcomings of 
supervision may lead to an unsafe act or situation.  
□ Inadequate identification of work place 
hazards 
□ Improper performance is rewarded or 
tolerated 
□ Improper recognition for at-risk behavior 
□ Failure to correct inappropriate behavior 
□ Failure to report unsafe tendencies 
□ Inadequate health hazard evaluation 
Policy/Procedure 
□ Failure to update/revise SOPs, policies, and 
procedures 
□ Inadequate enforcement of SOPs, policies 
and procedures 
□ Failure to implement accountability system 
Maintenance/Corrective Actions 
□ Failure to initiate corrective actions 
□ Failure to correct known reported problem 
□ Inadequate correction for prior safety 
hazards/incidents 
□ Failure to place appropriate priority on 
needed repairs 
Other  
□ Authorized unnecessary hazard 
Leadership Violation:
Safety/Hazard 
 A leader may knowingly 
disregard instructions, guidance, rules, or SOPs and 
create an unsafe act or situation. 
□ Enabling excessive risk taking 
□ Inadequate inspection 
□ Authorized unnecessary hazard 
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□ Set priority of production/cost over company 
requirements 
Policy/Procedure  
□ Violation of SOPs, policy, and procedures by 
leaders 
□ Leader encourages bending of rules/taking 
shortcuts 
□ Failure to enforce rules and regulations 
□ Fraudulent documentation 
□ Inadequate documentation 
Task Assignment  
□ Authorized unqualified worker to perform 
tasks 
□ Assigning incompetent operators to 
equipment 
Other  
□ Wilful disregard of authority by leader(s) 
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Resource Management:
Human Resources  
 Corporate-level decision-
making regarding the allocation and maintenance of 
organizational assets such as human resources, 
monetary assets, and equipment/facilities.  
□ Selection 
□ Staffing/manning 
□ Training (i.e. not developed) 
□ Procedures not integrated into training 
process 
□ Background checks 
□ Personnel resources 
□ Inadequate matching of qualifications for job 
□ Inadequate company approval process 
□ Inadequate contractor pre-qualification 
□ Use of non-approved contractor 
□ Inadequate specifications to contractor 
□ Inadequate research (i.e. materials, 
equipment) 
□ Inadequate review of potential failures   
□ Failure to check qualification for positions 
□ High turnover rates 
□ Short staffed 
□ Pay scales unreflective of position hierarchy 
□ Hiring/promotion schemes based on 
availability of workers not skills 
□ Promotions outside of subject area 
Monetary/Budget Resources 
□ Excessive cost cutting 
□ Lack of funding 
□ Lack of logistical support 
□ Failure to correct known design flaws 
Equipment/Facility Resources 
□ Inadequate design 
□ Workspace working conditions 
□ Purchasing unsuitable equipment/parts 
□ Inadequate vehicle for the purposed used 
□ Inadequate equipment working conditions 
□ Inadequate specifications on invoice 
□ Inadequate mode or route of shipment 
□ Inadequate receiving inspection and 
acceptance 
□ Improper handling of materials 
□ Improper storage of materials 
□ Improper substitution 
□ Inadequate material packaging/container 
□ Exceeded shelf life 
□ PPE not available 
□ Improper salvage and/or waste disposal 
□ Failure to update/supply MSDS 
□ Inadequate monitoring of construction 
□ Other 
Organizational Climate
Structure 
: The working atmosphere 
within the organization can be reflected in an 
organization's structure, policies, and culture.  
□ Inadequate organizational chain of 
command 
□ Inadequate organizational communication 
□ Inadequate accessibility/visibility of 
leadership 
□ Improper/insufficient delegation of authority 
□ Inadequate formal accountability for actions 
□ Inadequate accountability system in place 
□ No accountability of SOPs 
□ Unclear/conflicting reporting relationships 
□ Unclear/conflicting assignment of 
responsibility 
□ Organizational structure 
Policy  
□ Human resource policy/practice/procedure 
not practiced, enforced or consistent 
□ Inadequate evaluation/promotion/upgrade 
□ Promotions within crews 
□ Inadequate hiring, firing, and retention 
□ Drugs and alcohol policy not enforced 
□ Inadequate incident reporting, investigation, 
and corrective action policy and practice 
□ Shift rostering  
Culture  
□ Norms and rules 
□ Organizational customs/values not clearly 
defined 
□ Organizational customs/values not clearly 
understood 
□ Safe organizational customs not established 
□ Organizational justice 
□ Citizen behavior 
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□ Inadequate organizational influence of 
behavior 
□ Inadequate response to worker feedback 
□ Workplace culture hinders communication 
□ Assuming competence in safety critical tasks 
□ Avoid conflict 
□ Lack of knowledge sharing 
□ Workplace bullying, harassment, 
discrimination 
□ Top management not involved in day to day 
operations 
□ Safety not a priority 
□ Production first, safety second 
□ Other 
 
Organizational Process
Operations  
: The formal process by which 
things get done within the organization.  
□ Inadequate operations: operational tempo 
creates risks 
□ Worker/production schedules create risks 
□ Proper incentives lacking 
□ Measurement/appraisal 
□ Quotas 
□ Time pressure 
□ Deficient planning 
Procedures  
□ Policy/standard guidelines not written 
□ Lack of SOPs 
□ SOPs inconsistent with work practices 
□ Inadequate performance standards 
□ Lack of working involvement with SOP 
creation 
□ Unclear definition of objectives 
□ Unclear definition of corrective action 
□ Outdated SOPs/no revision schedule 
□ Inadequate procedural guidance/publications 
□ Inadequate procedures/instructions about 
procedures 
□ Inadequate organizational training 
issues/programs 
□ Inadequate organizational training: objectives 
and goals not well defined 
□ Inadequate organizational training: curriculum 
and delivery process not well defined 
□ Inadequate procedural documentation 
□ Lack of job safety analyses conducted 
□ Inadequate job safety analysis performed 
Oversights  
□ Lack of established safety program/risk 
management program 
□ Risk management program not adequately 
implemented/maintained 
□ Safety management process not adequately 
implemented/maintained 
□ Inadequate safety and health management 
system 
□ Inadequate risk management 
□ Inadequate incident reporting/investigation 
□ Inadequate performance measures 
□ Failure to document change 
□ Inadequate or incorrect performance 
feedback 
□ Inadequate program oversight: management 
failed to monitor resources, climate, and 
process to ensure a safe work environment. 
□ Other 
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